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Abstract
Recent theoretical work has suggested a number of potentially important factors in causing
incomplete pass-through of exchange rates to prices, including markup adjustment, local costs
and barriers to price adjustment. We empirically analyze the determinants of incomplete pass-
through in the coffee industry. The observed pass-through in this industry replicates key features
of pass-through documented in aggregate data: prices respond sluggishly and incompletely to
changes in costs. We use microdata on sales and prices to uncover the role of markup adjustment,
local costs, and barriers to price adjustment in determining incomplete pass-through using a
structural oligopoly model that nests all three potential factors. The implied pricing model
explains the main dynamic features of short and long-run pass-through. Local costs reduce
long-run pass-through by a factor of 59% relative to a CES benchmark. Markup adjustment
reduces pass-through by an additional factor of 33%, where the extent of markup adjustment
depends on the estimated “super-elasticity” of demand. The estimated menu costs are small
(0.23% of revenue) and have a negligible effect on long-run pass-through, but are quantitatively
successful in explaining the delayed response of prices to costs. We find that delayed pass-
through in the coffee industry occurs almost entirely at the wholesale rather than the retail
level.
Keywords: exchange rate pass-through, menu costs, discrete choice model.
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1 Introduction
A substantial body of empirical work documents that exchange rate pass-through to prices is
delayed and incomplete (Engel, 1999; Parsley and Wei, 2001; Goldberg and Campa, 2006). These
studies show that the prices of tradable goods respond sluggishly and incompletely to variations
in the nominal exchange rate. An increase in the exchange rate leads to a substantially less
than proportional increase in traded goods prices; and much of the price response occurs with a
substantial delay.1
Recent theoretical work has suggested a number of potentially important factors in explaining
incomplete pass-through. First, in oligopolistic markets, the response of prices to changes in costs
depends both on the curvature of demand and the market structure (Dornbusch, 1987; Knetter,
1989; Bergin and Feenstra, 2001). Second, local costs may play an important role in determining
pass-through (Sanyal and Jones, 1982; Burstein, Neves and Rebelo, 2003; Corsetti and Dedola,
2004). Local costs drive a wedge between prices and imported costs that is unresponsive to exchange
rate fluctuations. As a consequence, if local costs are large, even a substantial increase in the price
of an imported factor of production could have little impact on marginal costs. Third, price rigidity
and other dynamic factors have the potential to contribute to incomplete pass-through (Giovannini,
1988; Kasa, 1992; Devereux and Engel, 2002; Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2003).
We study pass-through in the coffee industry. Coffee is the world’s second most traded commod-
ity after oil. Over the past decade, coffee commodity prices have exhibited a remarkable amount of
volatility. However, retail and wholesale coffee prices have responded sluggishly and incompletely
to changes in imported commodity costs—an important feature of the aggregate evidence.2
The response of prices to changes in costs is intimately related to the response of prices to
exchange rates. Indeed, the equations used to estimate the response of prices to exchange rates
are derived from equations that relate prices to marginal costs. In standard exchange rate pass-
through regressions, foreign inflation is used to proxy for marginal costs, and prices are regressed
separately on costs and exchange rates. The coffee market is an ideal laboratory to study how costs
pass-through into prices since a large fraction of marginal costs are observable for this industry.
Coffee commodity costs are, moreover, buffeted by large, observable, non-monetary factors. This
makes price responses easier to interpret than in the standard case of exchange rate pass-through,
since exchange rate movements may be closely linked to monetary factors, at least in the long run,
and such factors may have a direct effect on prices, independent of movements in the exchange rate
(Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc, 2008; Bouakez and Rebei, 2008).3
For both retail and wholesale prices, a one percent increase in coffee commodity costs leads to
an increase in prices of approximately a third of a percent over the subsequent 6 quarters (we refer
to this as long-run pass-through). More than half of the price adjustment occurs with a delay of
one quarter or more. By wholesale prices, we mean the prices charged by coffee roasters like Folgers
and Maxwell House, which we also refer to as manufacturer prices.
1See also Frankel, Parsley, and Wei (2005) and Parsley and Popper (2006).
2This has generated considerable public interest in coffee markets. In 1955, 1977 and 1987, the US Congress
launched inquiries into the pricing practices of coffee manufacturers.
3An important strand of the international economics literature seeks to understand incomplete pass-through to
the prices of imported inputs “at the dock”. We focus instead on incomplete pass-through at the manufacturer and
retail level, where imported inputs are an intermediate good.
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Reduced form regressions indicate that delayed pass-through in this industry occurs almost
entirely at the wholesale level. This evidence suggests that, to the extent that barriers to price
adjustment contribute to delayed pass-through in this industry, it is wholesale price rigidity that
matters. Recent research on price dynamics has focused on price rigidity at the retail level, partly
because retail price data are more readily available to researchers. The finding that, at least in
the coffee industry, the majority of incomplete pass-through arises at the level of wholesale prices
indicates that studies that focus exclusively on retail prices may be incomplete in an important
way.4 We document substantial rigidity in coffee prices at both the wholesale and retail level: over
the time period we consider, manufacturer prices of ground coffee adjust on average 1.3 times per
year, while retail prices excluding sales adjust on average 1.5 times per year over the same time
period. The frequency of wholesale price adjustment is highly correlated with commodity cost
volatility: wholesale prices adjust substantially more frequently during periods of high commodity
cost volatility. Goldberg and Hellerstein (2007) similarly document an important role for wholesale
price rigidity in the beer market using data from a large US supermarket chain.
We build a structural model of the coffee industry and investigate its success in explaining the
facts about pass-through. We begin by estimating a model of demand for coffee. The coffee market,
like most markets, is best described as a differentiated products market. The main difficulty of
estimating demand curves in a differentiated products industry is that an unrestricted specification
of the dependence of aggregate demand on prices leads to an extremely large number of free
parameters. It is therefore useful to put some structure on the nature of demand. We do this by
specifying a discrete choice model of demand (McFadden, 1974). This type of structural model
places restrictions on the cross-price elasticities by assuming utility maximizing behavior, thereby
resulting in a substantially more parsimonious model. We follow Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes
(1995) in estimating a random coefficients model with unobserved product characteristics. An
advantage of the coffee industry in estimating the demand system is that coffee prices are buffeted
by large exogenous shocks to supply in the form of weather shocks to coffee producing countries.
We use these weather shocks as instruments to identify the price elasticity of demand.
We combine this demand model with a structural model of the supply side of the coffee industry.
We fix the number of firms and the products produced by the firms to match the observed industry
structure. We account for the observed degree of price rigidity by assuming that firms must pay
a “menu cost” in order to adjust their prices. According to this model, firms face a fixed cost of
price adjustment that leads them to adjust their prices infrequently: we do not take a stand on the
sources of the barriers to price adjustment.5 The barriers to price adjustment imply that the model
is a dynamic game. We then analyze the equilibrium response of prices to costs in a Markov perfect
equilibrium of this model. In our baseline estimation procedure, we use local costs estimated from
4Retailers nevertheless play an important role in determining the level of pass-through since they insert an ad-
ditional wedge between imported costs and prices. Furthermore, though we do not analyze this channel, retailer-
manufacturer interactions may play an important role in determining manufacturer pricing behavior, and may even
be one motive for manufacturer-level price rigidity. The role of retail behavior in determining pricing behavior is
analyzed in detail by Hellerstein (2005) and Villas-Boas (2007).
5See, for example, Zbaracki et al. (2004) for an attempt to quantify different sources of barriers to price adjust-
ment. While understanding the sources of barriers to price adjustment is an important topic for future research, in
this paper we simply make use of the menu cost model as an empirical framework for the price rigidity observed in
the data. This framework generates two main empirical predictions: prices adjust infrequently, and there are more
price adjustments in periods when there is greater incentive to adjust. As we discuss below, the data are broadly
supportive of both predictions.
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a static model in order to avoid the problem of searching over a large number of parameters in the
dynamic estimation procedure. We also consider an alternative procedure in which we estimate a
common component in marginal costs as part of the dynamic estimation procedure. Incorporating
price rigidity in the model is crucial both because of its impact on short-run dynamics and because
ignoring these factors could otherwise bias our estimates of the role of local costs and markup
adjustment (Engel, 2002).
We find that the dynamic pricing model, estimated using panel data on prices and market shares,
replicates the main dynamic features of pass-through in the short and long-run. We use the model
to determine the role of local costs, markup adjustment and menu costs in long-run pass-through.
We do this by comparing our baseline dynamic model to successively simpler models. We find that
local costs reduce pass-through by a factor of 59% relative to a CES benchmark, while markup
adjustment reduces pass-through by an additional factor of 33%. Menu costs have a negligible
effect on long-run pass-through, though they play an important role in explaining short-run pricing
dynamics as we discuss above.6 Our conclusions underscore the need to allow for additional channels
of incomplete pass-through in the large literature in international macroeconomics in which rigid
prices are the main source of imperfect adjustment of prices to costs.7
In comparing the model to the data, we emphasize three main features of our results. First, in
the long-run, markup adjustment in response to cost shocks is substantial: firms are estimated to
compress their gross margins on average by a factor of 1/3 in response to a marginal cost increase.
This implies that a one percent increase in coffee commodity costs leads to a “long-run” pass-
through into prices of approximately a third of a percent over the subsequent 6 quarters, despite
a much larger fraction of marginal costs being accounted for by green bean coffee. Klenow and
Willis (2006) coin the term “super-elasticity” of demand for the percentage change in the price
elasticity for a given percentage increase in prices and show that it is a key determinant of how
prices respond to costs in macroeconomic models. While the Dixit-Stiglitz model implies a super-
elasticity of demand of 0, we estimate a median super-elasticity of demand of 4.64, generating a
substantial motive for markup adjustment.8
Second, the menu cost model parameterized to fit the overall frequency of price change is
quantitatively successful in matching the short-run dynamics of pass-through. Most of the price
adjustment occurs in the quarters after the initial change in costs. The menu costs imply a sub-
stantial amount of price rigidity: prices adjust only every 9 or 10 months. Yet, menu costs are
found to play a negligible role in explaining long-run pass-through after 6 quarters.
Third, our analysis strongly favors the dynamic menu cost model over a pricing model in which
firms set prices purely according to a fixed schedule as in the Taylor model (Taylor, 1980) or change
prices with a fixed probability as in the Calvo model (Calvo, 1983). The central prediction of the
menu cost model is that price adjustments occur more frequently in periods when marginal costs
change substantially. While this is an important prediction of the menu cost model, it has been
6These results echo the findings of Goldberg and Verboven (2001) for the European car market, as well as the
findings of Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2005) for the behavior of tradable goods prices following large deval-
uations in terms of the large role played by local costs. Our findings are also consistent with the results of Lubik and
Schorfheide (2005). For other interesting attempts to distinguish between markup adjustment and price rigidity in
explaining exchange rate pass-through see Giovannini (1988) and Marston (1990).
7See e.g. Engel (2002) for a discussion of this literature.
8See also Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983) for a useful discussion of how the shape of the demand curve affects the
response of prices to costs.
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difficult to study given the difficulty of observing marginal costs. This prediction of the model
is borne out strongly by the data. There is a strong positive relationship between turbulence in
the coffee commodity market and the frequency of price change in a given year.9 Moreover, the
observed price rigidity and delayed response of prices to costs can be explained by a plausibly small
magnitude of adjustment costs (0.23% of revenue). Small menu costs are found to generate a large
amount of price rigidity both because of relatively inelastic demand and because local costs account
for a large fraction of marginal costs.
It is worth emphasizing that neither the model’s fit to the dynamics of pass-through nor its fit
to the timing of price adjustments are “guaranteed” by the estimation procedure: the estimation
procedure uses information on long-run average prices, demand, and frequency of price change, but
does not make use of the empirical evidence on pass-through or the timing of price adjustments.
The predictions of this type of model depend on a number of factors that do not arise in a
static context. Since firms consider not only current but future costs in making pricing decisions,
pass-through depends on the dynamics of marginal costs. In the case of a monopolistic competition
model with a symmetric profit function, it is clear by symmetry that if marginal costs have a unit
root then prices adjust to the static optimum conditional on adjusting (Dixit, 1991). This intuition
essentially goes through in the present model as well—implying that menu costs have little impact
on long-run pass-through in the unit root case. The unit root case is relevant for the coffee market
since we cannot reject the hypothesis that coffee commodity costs have a unit root. Yet, we show
that even in the unit root case, dynamic considerations matter for the magnitude of the menu costs
required to explain a given amount of price rigidity. We also investigate quantitatively how sensitive
our results on both pass-through and the magnitude of the menu cost are to the persistence of costs,
the degree of consumer heterogeneity and the model of price adjustment behavior (i.e. menu cost
vs. the Calvo (1983) model).
The basic approach we use to study pass-through in this industry builds on recent work by
Goldberg and Verboven (2001) and Hellerstein (2005). These papers provide detailed models of
pricing in particular industries, and analyze their models’ implications for pass-through. In partic-
ular, Hellerstein (2005) introduces a novel decomposition of the sources of incomplete pass-through
into non-traded costs and markup adjustment. These analyses have focused on the contemporane-
ous response of prices to changes in costs. Yet, the delayed response of prices to costs suggests that
dynamic factors are also important in explaining pass-through and may affect existing empirical
results. Engel (2002) argues that Goldberg and Verboven (2001) overestimate the role of local costs
because they do not allow for price rigidity.
This paper extends the existing static models to incorporate additional empirical facts about
delayed and incomplete pass-through. Goldberg and Hellerstein (2007) carry out a closely related
study of the role of price rigidity in pass-through in the beer market, but approximate the firms’
pricing policies using a static model. In contrast, we firm pricing policies in a dynamic framework.
The menu cost pricing model in this paper builds on Slade (1998, 1999) and Aguirregabiria (1999)
who incorporate menu costs into industrial organization models of price adjustment in order to
estimate the barriers to price adjustment. Another closely related paper is Kano (2006) which
also solves for the Markov Perfect Equilibrium of a dynamic menu cost model using numerical
9Similarly, Davis and Hamilton (2004) find that a monopolistic competition model with menu costs is broadly
successful in explaining the timing of price adjustments in the wholesale gasoline market.
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methods. More broadly, this paper is related to a large empirical literature on cost pass-through as
well as a growling literature on state-dependent pricing models solved using numerical methods.10
Bettendorf and Verboven (2000) study the relationship between Dutch coffee prices and commodity
costs in a static oligopoly model and find similar results on the magnitude of non-coffee bean costs.
One issue that arises in this type of analysis based on a particular industry is the extent to which
conclusions based on one particular industry can be extended to understand pricing dynamics in
other industries. The major players in this industry—Proctor & Gamble, Kraft and Sara Lee—are
some of the world’s largest consumer packaged goods companies, suggesting that studying their
pricing behavior in one market may give insights into their behavior in other markets as well.
The extent of price rigidity observed in the coffee industry is also typical: the average duration of
wholesale prices is approximately 9 months, which is similar to the median duration of prices in the
U.S. producer price index (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008). Our conclusions about the importance
of price dynamics at the retail versus the wholesale level may also be useful in understanding
price dynamics in other industries. Retailers play an important role in numerous sectors of the
economy, particularly food, clothing and household furnishings, which account for more than 30%
of US consumption. Understanding the relationship between retail and wholesale prices is therefore
crucial in understanding price dynamics for a large part of the US economy. Relative to other
industries, imported costs may be a particularly large fraction of marginal costs in the coffee
industry—indeed, we selected the coffee industry in part because of the disproportionate share
of marginal costs accounted for by imported intermediate goods (coffee beans).11 Regarding our
conclusions about the role of markup adjustment in explaining long-run pass-through, since coffee
costs are highly correlated across firms, different coffee producers’ incentives to adjust their prices
tend to be coordinated. In markets where firms face disparate cost shocks, the incentive for a firm
to compress its markup in response to a cost increase may be even greater. Finally, our conclusions
regarding the limited role of menu costs in explaining long-run pass-through after 6 quarters depend
importantly on the persistence and volatility of commodity costs, but are relevant to pass-through
of other highly persistent costs such as exchange rates and wages. Our conclusions regarding the
role of menu costs also depend on the nature of strategic interactions implied by our estimated
model of demand, as we discuss in section 7.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the data used in the paper.
Section 3 presents stylized facts about price adjustment in the coffee industry. Section 4 describes
the demand model and presents empirical estimates of the demand side of the model. Section 5
presents estimates of local costs derived using a static oligopoly model. We evaluate the robustness
of these estimates to dynamic considerations in appendix B. Section 6 presents the full supply
side of the model. This section presents the menu cost oligopoly model, as well as our menu
cost estimates based on the dynamic model. Section 7 establishes the predictions of the model
for incomplete pass-through in the short and long-run, and investigates the relative importance
of markup adjustment, local costs and menu costs. Section 8 contains a number of counterfactual
10In the cost pass-through literature, see Kadiyali (1997), Gron and Swenson (2000) and Levy et al. (2002). See also
Bettendorf and Verboven (2000) and the references therein for specific analyses of coffee prices in various countries.
A recent example of a numerical state dependent pricing model in the international economics literature is Floden
and Wilander (2004). See also Gross and Schmitt (2000) for an alternative explanation of delayed pass-through.
11Of course, some consumer goods are imported in finished form, and only contain local goods in the form of costs
of distribution or transportation. However, most imported products are intermediate goods or investment goods
rather than final consumer products.
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simulations that investigate how our estimates of menu costs and results on incomplete pass-through
depend on the persistence of costs, the curvature of demand and the model of price adjustment
behavior. Section 9 concludes.
2 Data on Prices and Costs
We pull together data on prices and costs from a number of sources to develop our model of the
coffee industry. We use data on prices and sales from two industry sources. Our source for retail
price and sales data is monthly AC Nielsen data. These data are market-level average prices and
sales for the period 2000-2004. We use these data to construct series on retail prices and market
shares.12
We use wholesale price data from PromoData. Promodata collects data on manufacturer prices
for packaged foods from grocery wholesalers. Promodata collects its information from the largest
grocery wholesaler in a given market but does not identify the wholesaler for confidentiality reasons.
These data provide the price per case charged by the manufacturer to the wholesaler for a particular
UPC in a particular week. The data start in January 1997 and end in December 2005. Because
Promodata surveys a much less complete array of markets and wholesalers than AC Nielsen, the
wholesale price data cover a substantially less complete array of markets than the retail data. Data
are available for 31 of the 50 retail markets, though the time span covered varies by market, leading
to an unbalanced panel of observations. Moreover, data are typically only available for the leading
products in each market. The wholesale price data have certain advantages over the retail data. In
particular, since the wholesale data are prices for individual products from particular manufacturers
to a particular wholesaler in a particular week, we can use these data to analyze price rigidity.
In a recent report by the Brazil Information Center (Brazil-Information-Center-Inc., 2002),
about half of 20 large US retailers interviewed reported using grocery wholesalers, though the
fraction was lower among the largest supermarkets in this group. In general, the price quoted to
a grocery wholesaler is non-negotiable, and the product is delivered directly to the wholesaler’s
warehouse. The grocery wholesaler then resells the product to a supermarket.
The wholesale price data contain information on both base prices and “trade deals”. Trade
deals are discounts offered to the grocery wholesalers to encourage promotions. For some types of
trade deals, manufacturers require proof that a promotion has been carried out in order to redeem
the discount. According to a former grocery wholesale executive, since advertising is often carried
out collectively by grocery stores associated with a particular wholesaler, in many cases, the funds
associated with the trade deal are used by a grocery collective for promotional purposes rather than
being passed on to individual stores. The cost pass-through regressions we present are for prices
including trade deals, though our results on pass-through are similar both including and excluding
trade deals.
The commodity price data are based on commodity prices on the New York Physicals market
collected by the International Coffee Organization (ICO). We focus on price responses to a “com-
posite commodity index” that we construct in the following way. We take a weighted average of the
12AC Nielsen collects prices from cooperating supermarkets with at least $2 million in sales. Sales by super-
centers, such as Walmart and Target, are not covered in the data. The 50 AC Nielsen markets span almost the entire
continental United States. AC Nielsen markets are generally considerably larger than cities.
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commodity prices for Colombian Mild Arabicas, Other Mild Arabicas, Brazilian and Other Natural
Arabicas, and Robustas. We weight the commodity prices for the different varieties based on the
average composition of U.S. coffee consumption from Lewin, Giovannucci, and Varangis (2004) over
the years 1993-2002. These weights have remained relatively stable over the sample period. We
adjust the commodity price for the fact that roasted green coffee beans lose about 19% of their
weight during the roasting process.
To construct the graphs of aggregate series in section 3, we make use of retail and wholesale
price indexes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In particular, we make use of the “ground coffee”
retail price index and the “roasted coffee” wholesale price index downloaded from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics webpage.
In principle, it would be preferable to separately analyze the response of coffee retail and
wholesale prices to movements in the prices of different types of green bean coffee.13 Unfortunately,
reliable estimates of the composition of different brands of coffee by coffee bean type are not
available. However, the effect of analyzing responses to the coffee commodity index rather than
individual coffee types is likely to be small for two reasons. First, the prices for different types
of green bean coffee covary strongly. Second, as we note above, the consumption weights of the
different types of coffee for the U.S. as a whole have changed little over the sample period.
3 Cost Pass-Through Regressions
Let us begin by looking at the relative movements of coffee prices and costs over the past decade.14
Figure 1 presents a graph of average retail, wholesale and commodity prices in US dollars per ounce.
To be clear about terminology, we shall refer to the price charged by supermarkets to consumers as
the retail price, the price charged by coffee roasters such as Folgers and Maxwell House to grocery
wholesalers as the wholesale price, and the price of green bean coffee on the New York market as
the commodity cost.
The vast majority of coffee sold in the U.S. is imported in the form of green bean coffee (the
largest coffee producing countries are Brazil, Colombia and Vietnam). Coffee manufacturers roast,
grind, package and deliver the coffee to the American market.15 Green bean coffee prices were
highly volatile over the period we study, losing almost two thirds of their value between 1997 and
2002. Most of the volatility in commodity costs arises from weather conditions in coffee producing
countries, planting cycles and new players in the coffee market. Since coffee commodity prices are
quoted in U.S. dollars, commodity prices have also been affected by the rise and fall of the value
of the U.S. dollar.
We document three facts about prices and costs in the coffee market: 1)the pass-through of
coffee commodity prices to retail and wholesale coffee prices, 2)the response of retail to wholesale
coffee prices, and 3)the extent of price rigidity in wholesale prices in the coffee industry. First, we
document the dynamics of the relationship between prices and costs. Figure 1 shows that retail and
13In some industries, shifting input composition plays an important role in determining cost pass-through. See
Gron and Swenson (2000).
14This section draws heavily on the analysis in Leibtag et al. (2005).
15In order to manufacture one ounce of ground roasted coffee, 1.19 ounces of green bean coffee are required. In
1997, the U.S. imported over 20 million bags of green bean (unprocessed) coffee in 1999 (2.5 billion dollars), but only
about 0.7 million bags of roasted coffee.
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wholesale prices tracked commodity prices closely over this period. The close relationship between
prices and commodity costs is not surprising given the large role of green bean coffee in ground
coffee production. Industry estimates suggest that green bean coffee accounts for more than half of
the marginal costs of coffee production.16 To quantify this relationship, we estimate the following
standard pass-through regression,
∆ log pljmt = a+
6∑
k=1
bk∆ logCt−k +
4∑
k=1
dkqk + , (1)
where l = r, w, ∆ log prjmt is the log retail price change of product j in market m, ∆ log p
w
jmt is the
corresponding log wholesale price change, ∆ logCt−k is the log commodity cost index, qt is a quarter
of the year dummy, a, bk and dk are parameters and  is a mean zero error term. The wholesale
price series include trade deals; the results excluding trade deals are virtua.17 The coefficients bk
may be interpreted as the percentage change in prices associated with a given percentage change
in commodity costs k quarters ago. The empirical model follows the approach of Goldberg and
Campa (2006). The model is motivated by the fact that, as in Goldberg and Campa (2006), the
regressor is highly persistent: a Dickey-Fuller test for the hypothesis of a unit root in commodity
prices cannot be rejected at a 5% significance level. Goldberg and Campa (2006) define the long-run
rate of pass-through in this model as the sum of the coefficients
∑6
k=1 bk. We selected the number
of lags included in the regression such that adding additional lags does not change the estimated
long-run rate of pass-through. We estimate the model using the retail and wholesale price data
described in Section 2, for quarterly changes in prices and costs over the 2000-2005 period.18
Table 1 presents the results of the pass-through regression for retail and wholesale prices. We
present estimates from two types of pass-through regressions. Columns 1 and 2 of table 1 present
the results of the standard pass-through regression (1). The results reflect a substantial amount
of incomplete pass-through in percentage terms. The estimated long-run pass-through elasticity
is 0.252 for retail prices and 0.262 for wholesale prices. In other words a one percent increase in
commodity costs eventually leads to only about a quarter of a percent increase in coffee prices.
We do not find evidence that prices systematically react asymmetrically to price increases or de-
creases.19 This finding is consistent with the findings in Gomez and Koerner (2002) for the US,
France and Germany. Table 1 also documents that there is a substantial delay in the response of
prices to commodity costs. For both retail and wholesale prices, more than half of the adjustment
to a change in costs occurs in the period after the cost shock.20 It is, of course, also possible to
estimate standard exchange rate pass-through regressions instead of cost pass-through regressions.
16For example, a major producer estimated in 1976 that green bean coffee accounted for 82% of marginal costs
(Yip and Williams, 1985). Industry estimates suggest, however, that the fraction of marginal costs accounted for by
commodity costs have since fallen with the price of green bean coffee.
17Trade deals are slightly more common when commodity costs are low. The effect is, however, quantitatively
small: an increase in green bean coffee costs by 1 cent lowers the frequency of trade deals by about 0.2 percentage
points; the size of trade deals are not correlated in a statistically significant way with commodity costs.
18The standard errors for all of the regressions in this section are clustered by unique product and market to allow
for arbitrary serial correlation in the error term for a given product. See, for example, Wooldridge (2002) for a
discussion of this procedure.
19We considered asymmetries in the response of prices to commodity costs at 1-4 lags. See Leibtag et al. (2005)
for a more detailed discussion of this issue.
20Similar patterns of delayed and incomplete pass-through are found for the coffee market by the UK Competition
Commission (1991).
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Interestingly, these exchange-rate pass-through regressions yield substantially lower estimates of
pass-through: 0.21 and 0.04 respectively, again with the majority of pass-through occurring after
the initial quarter.
One might be concerned that long-term contracts for purchasing green bean coffee imply that
the average purchasing price of coffee manufacturers may differ from the coffee commodity price.
Yet, this concern ignores the fact that in an economic model, firms’ prices respond to marginal
costs rather than accounting costs. While hedging contracts affect the firm’s total costs, they do
not affect its marginal costs, so long as the firm is always on the margin of buying or selling at the
observed commodity cost.
Columns 3 and 4 of table 1 present the results of the pass-through regression (1) in levels rather
than logs. For this specification, the long-run pass-through of retail prices to commodity costs
is 0.916, while the long-run pass-through to wholesale prices is 0.852. Thus, a one cent increase
in commodity prices leads to slightly less than a one cent increase in prices.21 The difference
between the regressions in levels and logs is explained by the substantial wedge between observed
prices and marginal costs, which implies that a one cent change corresponds to a substantially
smaller percentage change in prices than costs.22 This alternative specification of the pass-through
regression begs the question of whether it might be more relevant to consider cent-for-cent pass-
through as a benchmark for “complete” pass-through as opposed to a pass-through elasticity of 1.
Yet, a pass-through elasticity of 1 is an appealing benchmark both because it arises in the workhorse
Dixit-Stiglitz model (absent local costs) and because it is only possible to calculate pass-through
elasticities (rather than levels) using standard data sources on price indicies.23
Second, we document the responsiveness of retail prices to manufacturer prices. This analysis
investigates to what extent delays in pass-through occur at the wholesale versus the retail level.
This issue matters both for how we model price adjustment behavior, and what data are most
relevant for parameterizing the model. In order to analyze this issue, we consider the following
21An alternative approach would be to estimate a panel error correction model. We cannot reject the null of no
cointegration of coffee prices and coffee bean costs in aggregate data over the time period we consider. Nevertheless,
as a robustness check, we also estimated a number of specifications that allow for a cointegrating relationship between
prices and green bean coffee costs. We estimated a vector error correction model (with a restricted constant) for
aggregate data on ground coffee manufacturer prices and the commodity cost index (the data series underlying
Figure 1) for the 1994-2005 period. This model implied similar results to specification 1: approximately cent-for-
cent pass-through in the long-run with less than half of the pass-through occurring in the first quarter, though the
parameter estimates were much less precise. Estimating panel vector error correction models for panel data remains
econometrically challenging (Breitung and Pesaran, 2005) and a full analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of
this paper. However, we also reestimated specification 1 in both levels and logs while including, as a vector error
correction term, the price minus the commodity cost. These specifications yielded almost identical results to those
reported in Table 1.
22These statistics are for retail prices including temporary sales. A 1 cent per ounce increase in commodity costs is
associated with a 0.03 cent decrease in the difference between base prices (excluding sales) and net prices (including
sales)—about 3% of the overall pass-through, based on a fixed effects regression of the difference between base and
net prices on commodity costs and quarter dummies. According to this metric, temporary sales contribute little to
overall pass-through, though it is unclear how to interpret this fact given the complex dynamic response of demand
to temporary sales.
23We also considered instrumental variables estimates of the pass-through regressions in levels, using the weather
in Brazil and Colombia as instruments as discussed in section 4. We find similar results. The resulting estimates of
long-run pass-through are 0.968 for retail prices and 0.960 for wholesale prices.
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regression of retail prices on wholesale prices,
∆prjmt = α
r +
2∑
k=0
βrk∆p
w
jmt−k +
4∑
k=1
γrkqk + , (2)
where αr, βrk and γ
r
k are parameters, and  is a mean zero error term. The wholesale price data
are likely to be a noisy proxy for the wholesale costs faced by any particular retailer. To avoid
attenuation bias, we estimate this equation by instrumental variables regression with commodity
costs as instruments.24 Table 2 reports the results of this regression. The estimated pass-through
coefficient on contemporaneous changes in wholesale prices is 0.958, with small and insignificant
coefficients on the lagged wholesale price changes. This regression indicates that retail prices
respond immediately and approximately cent-for-cent to changes in wholesale prices associated
with cost shocks, indicating that almost all of the delays in pass-through in this market may be
explained by delays at the wholesale level. This result motivates a focus on both documenting and
explaining price adjustment at the wholesale level.
Third, we document the extent of price rigidity in manufacturer prices in the coffee industry.
Figure 2 presents a typical wholesale price series for coffee. The figure shows that wholesale coffee
prices have sometimes remained unchanged for substantial periods of time. Since 1997, Proctor
and Gamble (P&G), the maker of Folgers coffee has announced three major price increases and
eight major price decreases.25 P&G commented to reporters in conjunction with its 2004 price
increase that P&G “increases product prices when it is apparent that commodity price increases
will be sustained”. (Associated Press, Dec. 10 2004). Table 3 presents the statistics on the annual
evolution of the frequency of price adjustment for wholesale and retail prices, where the frequency of
price adjustment of retail prices is based on data from the consumer price index database analyzed
in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). The average frequency of wholesale price adjustment is 1.3 over
the 1997-2005 period while the average frequency of retail price adjustment excluding retail sales
is 1.5.26
There is a strong and statistically significant relationship between commodity cost volatility and
the frequency of price change. Table 4 presents statistics on the average number of wholesale price
adjustments per year over the period 1997-2003. Over the years 1997 to 2005, the average number
of price changes in a year varied between 0.2 and 4.3 for wholesale price changes not including trade
deals. Figure 3 plots the relationship between the average frequency of wholesale price changes and
the annual volatility of the monthly commodity cost index for the years 1997-2005, illustrating
a strong positive relationship. These patterns reflect a large amount of synchronization in price-
setting that coincides with times of high commodity cost volatility: in the quartile with the lowest
24The instruments we use are current changes in the commodity cost index and 12 month Arabica futures prices
as well as 6 lags of these variables.
25These statistics are based on price change announcements reported in the Lexis Nexus news archive.
26A key question in interpreting the evidence on wholesale price rigidity is whether rigid wholesale prices actually
determine the retail prices faced by consumers. Since manufacturers and retailers interact repeatedly, the observed
rigid prices may not be “allocative” (Barro, 1977). In particular, retail prices may react to cost shocks even when
wholesale prices do not. We find little evidence of this phenomenon in the coffee market: conditional on wholesale
prices, retail prices do not appear to react to changes in commodity prices. We estimated the regression, ∆ log prjmt =
η0 +
∑1
k=0
ηCk ∆ logCt−k +
∑1
k=0
ηrk∆ log p
w
jmt−k +
∑4
k=1
γrkqk + , by instrumental variables regression with the same
instruments used to estimate equation (2). The current wholesale price pwjmt had a coefficient of 1.001 while the
remaining coefficients are statistically insignificant at standard confidence levels.
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frequency of price change, less than 4.5% of products adjust their prices; while in the quartile with
the highest frequency of price change, more than 65% of products adjust their prices.
4 Consumer Demand
The first building block of my structural model of the coffee industry is a model of consumer
demand. We estimate a random coefficients discrete choice model for demand (Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes, 1995).27 In this model, the consumer is assumed to select the product that yields the
highest level of utility, where the indirect utility of individual i from purchasing product j takes
the form,
Uijmt = α0i + α
p
i (yi − prjmt) + xjβx + ξjmt + ijmt, (3)
where αpi is the parameter governing the individual-specific marginal utility of income, yi is income,
pjmt is the price in market m at time t, xj is a vector of product characteristics, βx is a vector of
parameters, and ξjmt is an unobserved demand shifter that varies across products and regions.28
We also allow the consumer to select the outside option of not purchasing ground caffeinated coffee.
Since the mean utility from the outside option is not separately identified, we normalize ξ0mt = 0
implying that the utility from the outside option is given by Ui0mt = α
p
i yi+i0mt. For computational
tractability, the idiosyncratic error term ijmt is assumed to be distributed according to the extreme
value distribution. Demand, in ounces of coffee, is then given by the market share sjmt, the fraction
of consumers for whom product j yields the highest value of utility, multiplied by the size of the
market M .
The key advantage of this type of structural model relative to an unrestricted model of demand
is that it allows for a substantial reduction in the number of parameters that must be estimated,
while still allowing for a substantial amount of flexibility in substitution patterns. To build intuition,
we begin by estimating the logit model, a simplified version of the full model in which αpi = α
p and
α0i = α
0 for all i. In this case, the model implies the following equation for aggregate shares,
log sjmt − log s0 = α0 − αpprjmt + xjβ + ξjmt, (4)
where α0 is a constant. We estimate the model on monthly price and market share data for ground,
caffeinated coffee for 50 US markets as defined by AC Nielsen, where the prices and market shares
are averages by market, brand, time period and size.29
To give a feel for the market structure of the coffee industry, let us note that some of the largest
coffee manufacturers in the U.S. are Folgers and Maxwell House, which are owned by Proctor &
Gamble and Kraft Foods respectively. The market for ground coffee is highly concentrated. Across
markets, the median Herfindahl index is 0.34 and the median fraction of coffee sales accounted
27Discrete choice models have been applied widely in the empirical organization literature. Other applications
include shopping destination choice (McFadden, 1974), cereal (Nevo, 2001) and yogurt (Villas-Boas, 2004). See
Anderson, Palma, and Thisse (1992) for an overview of this class of models.
28This expression for indirect utility may be derived from a quasi-linear utility function. One way of interpreting
this model is to view the consumer’s decision of what to consume as a discrete choice at each “consumption occasion”.
Given micro-level data on consumers’ purchases, an alternative approach would be to estimate an explicit model of
multiple discrete choices as in e.g. Hendel (1999).
29This is fairly standard in the literature that estimates discrete choice demand models using supermarket data.
See e.g. Nevo (2001). Many retailers do not stock multiple UPC’s within a brand-size category, suggesting that this
may be a more appropriate specification than one based on individual UPC’s.
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for by Folgers and Maxwell house alone is 0.80. On average, each brand produces two sizes of
ground caffeinated coffee, and three distinct coffee UPC’s. Among consumer packaged goods,
“store brands” account for relatively small fraction of total sales (4.7%).
The model is estimated using the top 15 products by volume sold nationally over the 5 year
sample period 2000-2004. These products account for 74% of the total AC Nielsen ground coffee
sales over this period.30 To estimate the model, it is necessary to define the total potential market
M . We define the relevant market as two cups of caffeinated coffee (made from ground coffee
purchased at supermarkets) for every individual 18 or over in a given market area per day.31
The classic econometric problem in demand estimation is the endogeneity of prices. Firms are
likely to set high prices for products with high values of the omitted characteristic ξjmt. This will
bias price elasticity estimates toward zero. Intuitively, the price elasticities are biased downward
because the model does not account for the fact that high priced products are also likely to be
particularly desirable. The first column of table 5 (OLS1) presents estimates of equation (4) where
xj includes only advertising, a dummy for product size, dummy variables for years, as well as
a dummy variable for December to account for demand fluctuations associated with Christmas.
The advertising data are brand-level monthly national total advertising dollars per brand from the
AdDollars database This specification yields an inelastic demand curve for the majority of products
and time periods: the median price elasticity is 0.54.32 An obvious potential explanation is the
endogeneity problem described above.
The panel structure of the data implies that we can account for fixed differences in ξjmt in a
flexible manner by introducing dummy variables (Nevo, 2001). These dummy variables allow for
constant differences in utility across products, as well as regional differences in the mean utility
of products. The second column of Table 5 (OLS2) presents estimates for the logit model includ-
ing brand-region fixed effects.33 Including fixed effects dramatically increases the estimated price
elasticity: the median price elasticity for the logit model including brand-region fixed effects is 1.96.
The inclusion of brand-region fixed effects does not, however, fully alleviate the endogeneity
problem since demand shocks may be correlated with prices over time. We compare the implica-
tions of a number of alternative approaches for instrumenting for prices and advertising. In the
third column (IV1), we instrument for prices and advertising using current and lagged average
prices of the same product in another market within the same census division, an instrumentation
strategy that is reasonable if demand shocks are uncorrelated across markets within a census divi-
sion (Hausman, 1996; Nevo, 2001). We refer to these instruments as Hausman instruments. The
median price elasticity estimate given this instrumentation strategy is considerably higher than
the OLS estimates: it is 3.02. The fourth column (IV2) presents the results of using commodity
30A simplifying feature of this market is that the leading ground coffee products have remained essentially unchanged
over this time period. Product entry and exit has therefore not been a major factor in driving demand.
31AC Nielsen market areas are somewhat larger than cities. The adult population in a market area is determined
by multiplying the total population in a given area (provided by AC Nielsen) by the fraction of adults in a given
area, calculated using the Current Population Survey. This specification implies that, depending on the market and
time period, the market share of the outside option is between 21% and 89% with a median value of 74%.
32In all of the regression estimates, we cluster the standard errors by unique product and market to allow for
unrestricted time series correlation in the error term. See, for example, Wooldridge (2002) for a discussion of this
procedure.
33We divide the U.S. into four regions: Northeast, Midwest, South and West using the suggested divisions in the
CPS. As in Nevo (2001), the remaining cross-sectional price differences (across markets) help to identify the cross
price-elasticities in some of our empirical specifications.
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costs as instruments. This approach yields a median price elasticity estimate of 2.69, a strategy
that seems more robust, though it requires that commodity costs are not influenced by trends in
demand for coffee in the U.S. market. The fifth column (IV3) presents results using the Brazilian
and Colombian exchange rates as instruments. This yields a slightly lower price elasticity of 2.34.
The sixth column (IV4) presents the results from using weather instruments: lagged minimum
and maximum temperatures for the Sao Paulo-Congonhas (Brazil) and the Cali-Alfonso Bonill
(Colombia) weather stations as instruments. We chose these weather stations because Colombia
and Brazil are two of the largest exporters of green bean coffee and because they are located at high
elevations where coffee is typically grown. The weather instruments have an R2 of 23% in explaining
average monthly retail prices (27% for non-sale retail prices) and 13% in explaining average monthly
advertising expenditures, once the series are adjusted for a year trend and a dummy for Christmas.34
This approach yields a price elasticity of 3.2. Since the weather instruments have the advantage
that they are least likely to be plagued by endogeneity concerns, we focus on this instrumentation
strategy in the random coefficients estimates below.
A disadvantage of the logit model noted by many authors is that it implies unrealistic substi-
tution patterns. For example, as the price of a “premium” product increases, there is no tendency
for demand to shift to other premium products rather than to other less similar products. One way
of generalizing the model is to allow for heterogeneity in individual preferences (Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes, 1995). In our baseline results, we estimate a simple version of the random coeffi-
cients model—equation (3)—in which an individual’s price sensitivity as well as the mean utility
of purchasing coffee is allowed to vary with his or her household income.
αi = α+ Πy˜i, (5)
where αi = [α0i , α
p
i ]
′, Π = [Πy0,Πyp]′ and y˜i is household income normalized, for ease of interpre-
tation, to have mean zero and variance of one across all markets that we consider. We assume
that y˜i has a log-normal distribution within markets, where the parameters of this distribution are
chosen to match the observed distribution of household income within each market for individuals
over 18 in the March Supplement of the 2000 Current Population Survey (CPS) after trimming
the bottom 2.5% of the sample (which includes negative and zero income observations).35 This
model allows for both heterogeneity in income within individual markets and variation in the mean
and variance of the income distribution across markets. A negative value for Πyp indicates that
higher income consumers are less responsive to prices. This parameter has important implications
for the curvature of demand: if there is a substantial amount of heterogeneity in price sensitivity
across consumers (Πyp is large in absolute value), then as a firm raises its price, its consumer base
is increasingly dominated by households with low price sensitivities, lowering the price elasticity
faced by the firm.
Let us now describe our estimation procedure for our full demand model. It will be useful in
describing the procedure to rewrite the indirect utility as Uijmt = δjmt + µijmt + ijmt where δjmt
captures the component of utility common to all consumers and µijmt is a mean-zero heteroskedastic
34This paper does not present a theory of how advertising expenditures are chosen. It is not clear why the weather
instruments would be useful instruments. It turns out, however, that average monthly advertising expenditures are
significantly positively correlated (over time) with average monthly prices, with a correlation coefficient of 0.48.
35We matched the CPS demographic data to the ACN market areas using the MSA and county code information
in the CPS and information provided by AC Nielsen on market coverage.
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term that reflects individual deviations from this mean.36 Given this decomposition, the aggregate
market shares may be written as a function of the mean utility and the heterogeneity parameter,
i.e. sjmt(δjmt,Πy). The basic estimation approach of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) relies on
two sets of moments,
sjmt(δjmt,Πy)− sˆjmt = 0, (6)
E(ξjmtzjmt) = 0, (7)
for all j,m, t, where sˆjmt are the empirical market shares and the zjmt are the instruments. We
follow Petrin (2002a) in incorporating an additional set of moments that makes use of the model’s
predictions about market shares for particular income groups to help identify the parameters re-
lating to consumer heterogeneity, so we have, Πyp and Πy0,
E(sjkmt(δjmt,Πy)− sˆjkmt|dj) = 0, (8)
where dj is a dummy variable for brand j, and k is an income group. These moments match the
model’s predictions for market shares within particular income groups to the market shares observed
in the data. The empirical brand shares by demographic group sˆjkmt are national averages of the
market shares of coffee brands for 5 different household income classes.37
We estimate the model using a two-stage GMM estimation procedure. Stacking the moment
conditions (6) -(8) yields the vector of moment conditions G(θ) where θ is a vector of parameters to
be estimated, where the vector θ0 denotes the true value of these parameters, and where E[G(θ0)] =
0. The GMM estimator is,
θˆ = argminθG(θ)
′WG(θ), (9)
where W is the optimal weighting matrix given by the inverse of the asymptotic variance-covariance
matrix of the moments G(θ), constructed using a preliminary consistent estimator of the param-
eters.38 The market shares implied by the model in (6)-(8) are simulated using 250 draws of
income yi. The standard errors for the coefficients are based on standard GMM formulas (Hansen,
1982) where we have “clustered” the standard errors by unique product and market, allowing for
an arbitrary correlation between observations in different years for the same unique product and
market.39
The estimated coefficients for the random coefficients model are presented in the last column of
Table 5. The median price elasticity estimate for this model is 3.46, which is slightly higher than
the corresponding estimate for the logit model. The standard error for this estimate is calculated
using a parametric bootstrap.40 This price elasticity estimate is very similar to the estimate of price
36In particular, the mean utility and individual component are given by δjmt = α
0 − αpprjmt + xjβx + ξjmt and
µijmt = −Πy y˜iprjmt .
37The income classes are: under 30k, 30-50k, 50-70k, 70-100k and >100k. The demographic statistics are from
Leibtag et al. (2005) based on AC Nielsen scanner panel data for the period 1998-2003.
38The asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of G(θ) is block-diagonal since the sources of error from the two
moments are independent. The part of the variance-covariance matrix associated with the demographic moments
is calculated using the procedure described in Appendix B.1 of Petrin (2002b). We used first-stage estimates of
the parameters to calculate the part of the variance-covariance matrix associated with the mean utilities using the
standard GMM formulas.
39We do this by viewing all of the observations associated with a unique product-market as a single “observation”
(e.g. See Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995; Petrin, 2002).
40We calculated the standard error by drawing multiple values of the coefficients from the joint distribution of the
parameters implied by the estimates of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix.
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elasticity for manufacturers reported by Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2005)—3.65—despite
the fact that these two estimates are obtained using entirely different estimation strategies.41 Our
estimate implies a slightly more elastic demand curve than the the median price elasticities for
individual varieties obtained by Broda and Weinstein (2006) for a broad range of products. Broda
and Weinstein (2006) estimate a median price elasticity of 3.1 for individual product varieties
of imported goods for the period 1990-2001. The main advantage of our estimation procedure
compared to Broda and Weinstein (2006) is that, because we focus on a particular industry, we are
able to account for the potential endogeneity of prices using instrumental variables. More generally,
the price elasticity estimates we obtain are not unusual compared to demand elasticity estimates
for other consumer packaged goods. For example, Nevo (2001) finds a median price elasticity of
2.9 for breakfast cereals, and Villas-Boas (2007) finds price elasticities between 3 and 4 for yogurt.
The differentiated product demand system implies a particular model of markup adjustment
since it affects the curvature of the demand curve. We estimate a moderate degree of heterogeneity
in the price elasticity parameter. The estimated value of Πyp is −3.24, indicating that high income
households have moderately lower price elasticities than low income consumers. A household with
an income one standard deviation above the mean has a price elasticity about 20% below the price
elasticity of the median consumer. The income heterogeneity parameter Πyp plays an important
role in determining pass-through since it governs how the price elasticity faced by a firm changes
as the firm raises its prices. The point estimate of heterogeneity in the mean utility of coffee Πy0
is negative (-1.03) indicating that higher income consumers have a slightly lower utility for ground
coffee—as opposed to not purchasing coffee at all, or purchasing pre-made coffee at a cafe. However,
this parameter is not statistically significantly different from zero at standard confidence levels.
A key determinant of the response of prices to changes in costs is the “super-elasticity” of
demand–the percentage change in the price elasticity for a given percentage increase in prices
(Klenow and Willis, 2006). The workhorse Dixit-Stiglitz demand model has a super-elasticity of
zero, implying a constant markup under monopolistic competition. A positive super-elasticity of
demand implies that as a firm raises its price, the price elasticity it faces increases. We estimate
the super-elasticity of demand to be 4.64 in the random coefficients model. In other words, a 1%
increase in prices leads to a 4.64% increase in the price elasticity of demand. This generates a
substantial motive for the firm to adjust its markup.
Since the demand curve is an important input into our empirical exercise, we also carried out
a number of robustness exercises. In addition to our baseline random coefficients demand model,
we also estimated a specification that allows for an additional degree of heterogeneity in consumer
preferences that is unrelated to income,
αi = α+ Πy˜i + Πννi, (10)
where νi is distributed normally with mean zero and variance one. Since this specification is difficult
to identify using only time series variation in prices, we estimated the model using both the weather
instruments and the Hausman instruments described above. The Hausman instruments have the
advantage that they vary across different products, as well as over time. This specification yields
estimates of Πyp = −3.42, Πy0 = −0.91 and Πν = −3.08, with an implied median price elasticity
41Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2005) estimate price elasticities of demand for individual plants in the ground
coffee market using a linear demand model and plant-level productivity as instruments.
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of 3.96 and a super-elasticity of 5.04. As an additional robustness check, we also re-estimated our
baseline specification of the random coefficients model using only the BLP moment conditions,
equations (6) and (7), using the original weather instruments. While this approach yields must less
precise estimates, it has the advantage that it relies less on the structure of the model, since in this
case, the curvature of the demand curve is estimated purely based on time series variation in prices
and costs. Again, this estimation approach yields similar point estimates of the key parameters
to the baseline approach. This estimation approach yields a median price elasticity of 3.96 and a
median price super-elasticity of 4.37.
5 Local Costs
In modeling the response of prices to costs in the coffee industry, an important consideration is
that only some fraction of marginal costs are accounted for by coffee beans. The remaining “local
costs” of production play an important role in determining pass-through behavior since they drive
a wedge between fluctuations in imported costs and the marginal cost of production (Sanyal and
Jones, 1982; Burstein, Neves and Rebelo, 2003; Corsetti and Dedola, 2004). If local costs are
large, even a substantial increase in the price of an imported factor of production may increase
total marginal costs by only a small fraction. Local costs are also important in determining the
magnitude of adjustment costs, since they affect the incentives of a firm to adjust its price in
response to a given change in commodity costs.
The magnitude of the local costs cannot be observed directly. The oligopolistic structure of
the market implies that the difference between prices and commodity costs reflects a combination
of marginal costs and oligopolistic markups.42 Given a particular model of the supply side of the
industry, it is possible to infer the markup by “inverting” the demand system to find the vector of
marginal costs that rationalizes firms’ observed pricing behavior. Since we know exactly how many
ounces of green bean coffee are used to produce a given quantity of ground coffee, we can then
obtain estimates of the local costs of production by subtracting commodity costs from the inferred
marginal costs.43
We will ultimately be interested in a dynamic model of pricing that allows for price rigidity.
We begin, however, by inferring markups for a static Nash-Bertrand equilibrium (Bresnahan, 1987;
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995). To avoid searching over a large parameter space as part of
the dynamic estimation procedure, we use the estimates of local costs from the static model in the
baseline parameterization of the dynamic model analyzed in section 6. This procedure is exactly
correct if the introduction of menu costs only affects the dynamic response of prices to costs,
but does not affect the level of prices. This holds exactly in some simple dynamic models with
quadratic loss functions (e.g. Dixit, 1991). This property does not hold in the present model
because of asymmetries in the profit function and strategic interactions that imply that certainty
equivalence does not hold. To gauge how different this approach is from estimating local costs as
42Such markups are consistent with zero economic profit. For example, they may reflect substantial fixed and sunk
costs of entry in the coffee industry.
43The simple (and known) production relationship between green bean coffee and ground coffee is an advantage
of studying the coffee market. In other markets it is necessary to estimate a production function to determine the
contribution of imported inputs to production costs (see e.g. Goldberg and Verboven’s (2001) analysis of the auto
industry).
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part of the dynamic estimation procedure, we also consider an alternative approach in section 6 in
which we estimate a common component of local costs as part of the dynamic estimation procedure.
Let us begin by describing the static model. The supply side of the model consists of J multi-
product firms that each produce some subset of the products. We fix the number of firms and the
products produced by the firms to match the observed industry structure. For example, Folgers
and Maxwell House dominate the market for ground roasted coffee with a combined market share
by volume of over 65% in many U.S. cities. Firm j’s per-period profits pijmt in a market m at time
t may be written,
pijmt =
∑
k∈Υj
(pwkmt −mckmt)Mskmt − Fkm, (11)
where mckmt is the marginal cost of producing the product, Fkm is a fixed cost, Υj is the set of
products produced by firm j, and M is the size of the market. We assume a reduced form model
of retailer behavior: retail prices prkmt depend on wholesale prices such that ∂p
r(pwkmt)/∂p
w
kmt = 1.
This assumption is consistent with the empirical response of retail prices to wholesale price changes
documented in section 3.44
We assume that firms set wholesale prices to maximize the profits associated with their products
in a Bertrand-Nash fashion. The optimizing firms’ prices satisfy the first-order conditions,
skmt +
∑
k∈Υj
(pwkmt −mckmt)
∂skmt
∂prkmt
= 0. (12)
Let us define the matrix Φ such that the element Φkj is defined as −∂skmt/∂prjmt for k, j = 1, ...., J ,
and the matrix Ωˆ is defined such that the element Ωˆkj equals 1 if the same firm owns both products
k and j, and equals 0 otherwise. Finally, let us define Ω = Φ · Ωˆ. The first order conditions may
then be written in matrix form as,
smt − Ω(pwmt −mcmt) = 0, (13)
where smt, pwmt , mcmt and ξmt are vectors consisting of skmt, p
w
kmt, mckmt, and ξkmt for k = 1, ...,K
respectively. This equation may be inverted to give the following expression for the absolute markup
of wholesale prices over marginal costs,
pwmt −mcmt = Ω−1smt. (14)
The markup implied by this equation depends on the estimated demand system through Φ, as well
as the assumed oligopolistic market structure through Ωˆ. For example, a higher elasticity estimate
yields a lower markup based on equation (14) while a more concentrated market structure implies
a higher markup.
We use equation (14) to derive markups based on the observed wholesale prices and the ran-
dom coefficients discrete choice demand system estimated in section 4. Table 6 presents sum-
mary statistics on the percentage markup of price over marginal cost implied by this procedure.
Throughout this paper, we follow the convention in international economics and define the markup
44This assumption could be micro-founded, for example, by assuming that retailers face demand given by a logit
demand model. This reduced-form approach to modeling retail behavior abstracts from an important aspect of
pricing (see e.g. Hellerstein (2005) and Villas-Boas (2007)). However, the lack of detailed information on competition
at the retail level makes these issues challenging to analyze in our data.
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as (p − mc)/mc. The median percentage markup of price over marginal cost is 58.3%. These
estimates of the percentage markup are not unusual for consumer packaged goods industries. For
example, Nevo (2001) estimates a median markup of about 67% for the ready-to-eat cereal industry.
Villas-Boas (2007) estimates wholesale markups in the range of 25− 100% for yogurt.45
To obtain estimates of the local costs of production, we simply subtract coffee commodity costs
from the total marginal cost (which can be obtained by “inverting” the markup). A small estimated
markup therefore implies that local costs must be large to rationalize the observed prices and vice
versa. Table 6 presents statistics on the role of coffee beans in marginal costs. On average, coffee
beans account for almost half of marginal costs. This fraction is roughly consistent with industry
estimates of the magnitude of non-coffee costs reported in Yip and Williams (1985) and the Survey
of Manufacturers. These estimates are also similar to Bettendorf and Verboven’s (2000) results for
the Dutch coffee market. Since the inputs used to produce an ounce of coffee are relatively stable,
the fraction of marginal costs accounted for by coffee beans tends to rise with the commodity cost
of coffee. According to the census of manufacturers, green bean coffee accounted for 75% of non-
capital costs in 1997 when commodity costs were at a high, but the proportion fell to 43% by 2002
when commodity costs were at a low.
6 A Menu Cost Model of an Oligopoly
The standard static pricing model discussed in the previous section does not account for the in-
frequent price adjustments or delayed price responses documented in section 3. In this section, we
therefore extend the model to allow for adjustment costs in price-setting. The model builds on
previous menu cost models estimated using dynamic methods by Slade (1998, 1999) and Aguirre-
gabiria (1999). The model we use is, however, somewhat different from existing menu cost models
due to the oligopoly framework. In particular, we allow for small random costs of adjustment, as
for example in Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999). While the distribution of these costs is known,
the realization of the menu cost is private information. Incorporating menu costs into the firm’s
pricing problem makes the pricing problem fundamentally dynamic. If a cost change is expected to
persist for many periods, a forward-looking firm may choose to adjust its prices even if the current
benefit from doing so is quite small. Moreover, given the oligopoly setting, the firm recognizes that
its competitors may respond in the future to its current pricing decisions.
The model is formally related to the dynamic oligopoly model studied by Pakes and McGuire
(1994).46 It is not possible to solve analytically for the Markov perfect equilibrium of the model.
Therefore, we adopt methods from this literature (e.g. Benkard (2004)) to numerically solve for
the equilibrium pricing policies of the firms. The equilibrium concept that we adopt is a Markov
perfect Nash equilibrium, where the strategy space consists of firms’ prices (Maskin and Tirole,
45As a check on whether the estimates are reasonable, I also investigated the fraction of implied marginal costs
that are negative: we find that negative implied marginal costs occur extremely infrequently—less than 0.2% of the
time.
46As in the dynamic oligopoly literature, the assumptions that the adjustment cost is random and that it is private
information are helpful from a computational perspective since it implies that firms choose their actions in response
to the expected policies of their competitors, which helps to smooth their responses. Doraszelski and Pakes (2006)
provide a detailed overview of dynamic oligopoly models. While the present model is related to the dynamic oligopoly
models studied by Pakes and McGuire (1994) and Doraszelski and Pakes (2006), the dynamic pricing game we study
is not formally equivalent to these models.
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1988). This equilibrium concept restricts attention to pay-off relevant state variables, thus focusing
attention away from the large number of other subgame perfect equilibria that exist in this type of
model.
We use value function iteration to solve for the policies of the individual firms and then use
an iterative algorithm to update the firms’ policy functions until a fixed point is achieved. We
assume that demand is given by the demand system estimated in section 4. As in the case of the
Pakes-McGuire algorithm, there is no guarantee that this algorithm converges.47
6.1 Model
The model consists of a small number of oligopolistic firms. Firm j seeks to maximize the discounted
expected sum of future profits,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
pijmt(pwmt, Ct)− γjmt1(∆pwjmt 6= 0)
]
, (15)
where pwmt is the vector of wholesale prices (per ounce) in market m at time t, pijmt is the firm’s
per-period profit, Ct is the commodity cost, β is the firm’s discount factor, γjmt is a random menu
cost the firm pays if it changes its prices, and 1(∆pwjmt 6= 0) is an indicator function that equals one
when the firm changes its price. Equation 15 assumes that, though each firm produces multiple
products, its pricing decisions across products are coordinated. We discuss this assumption below.
Each firm maximizes profits. We assume that β = 0.99. The firm’s profits pijmt(pwmt, Ct) are given
by expression (11) above, where the relationship between retail and wholesale prices is discussed
below. The firm’s profits depend both on its own prices and the prices of its competitors.
The menu cost γjmt is independent and identically distributed with an exponential distribution;
i.e., F (γjmt) = 1− exp (− 1σγjmt). The firm’s draw of the menu cost γjmt is private information. In
every period, the pricing game has the following structure:
1. Firms observe the commodity cost Ct and their own draws of the menu cost γjmt.
2. Firms choose wholesale prices pwjmt simultaneously (without observing other firm’s draws of
γjmt).
The Bellman equation for firm j’s dynamic pricing problem is thus,
Vj(pwmt−1, Ct, γjmt) = max
pwjmt
Et
[
pijmt(pwmt, Ct)− γjmt1(∆pwjmt 6= 0) + βVj(pwmt, Ct+1, γjmt+1)
]
, (16)
where Et is the expectation conditional on all information known by firm j at time t including its
own menu cost γjmt. The expectation is taken over two sources of uncertainty: uncertainty about
the future commodity cost Ct+1 and uncertainty about competitors’ prices arising because the menu
costs are private information. Notice that a given firm’s profits and value function depend on all
firms’ prices through the demand curve. From the perspective of a firm’s competitors, its strategy
has two parts. First, the pricing rule pwj (p
w
mt−1, Ct) for all firms j = 1, ..., B gives the firm’s price if
47We are not aware of theoretical work guaranteeing the existence or uniqueness of a pure strategy equilibrium in
this type of oligopoly model. Indeed, there is no proof of uniqueness even for the static oligopoly model with demand
given by the discrete choice random coefficients model. We dealt with this issue by doing a numerical search for
other equilibria by starting the computational algorithm at alternative initial values. This approach always yielded
a unique equilibrium.
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it decides to change its price. Second, the probability function prj(pwmt−1, Ct) gives the probability
that the firm changes its price for a particular value of the publicly observable variables (pwmt−1, Ct).
An equilibrium is defined as a situation where a firm chooses optimal policies (i.e. the Bellman
equation (16) is satisfied), and the firm’s expectations are consistent with the equilibrium behavior
of the firm’s competitors. As we note above, the firm’s strategy is restricted to be Markov; i.e., to
depend only on the payoff-relevant state.
To make the problem computationally tractable, we make the following simplifying assumptions.
First, we assume that the prices for different sizes of the same brand move together (i.e., if the
per-ounce price of Folgers 16 ounce coffee increases by 10 cents then the same thing happens to the
per-ounce price of Folgers 40 ounce coffee). So we have,
pwkmt = p
w
jmt + αk, (17)
for all k ∈ Υj , where αk is a known parameter. This assumption is motivated by the fact that
empirically, the timing of price changes is often coordinated across products owned by the same
brand.48
Second, we assume that retail prices equal wholesale prices plus a known constant margin ξk,
prkmt = ξk + p
w
kmt. (18)
Marginal cost is modeled as the sum of a product-specific constant µk and the commodity cost,
mckmt = µk + Ct. (19)
This specification is meant to capture the idea that non-coffee costs are several times less variable
than coffee commodity costs. By adopting this specification, we also assume that the firm faces
constant returns to scale in production.49
Uncertainty about future costs takes the form,
Ct = a0 + ρCCt−1 + C , (20)
where C is distributed N(0, σ2C) and σ
2
C , a0 and ρC are known coefficients. Since a unit root in
commodity costs cannot be rejected at standard confidence levels, we model commodity costs as
a random walk; i.e., a0 = 0 and ρC = 1. Firms’ perceptions about the stochastic process of costs
play a key role in determining pass-through, as we discuss in section 7. For computational reasons,
we assume that commodity costs follow a random walk so long as costs lie between the bounds CH
and CL, but are bounded within this region.
The firm’s decision about whether to adjust its price depends on the difference between its
payoffs when it adjusts and when it does not adjust,
∆W = Wch −Wnch, (21)
48Conditional on at least one product from a particular brand adjusting in a given month, the probability of
adjustment across all products is 93.8% over the 1997-2005 period.
49This specification is consistent with the fact that the share of total variable costs accounted for by green bean
coffee rises, as reported in the Annual Survey of manufacturers, rises when green bean coffee prices are high. If
marginal costs are increasing in output, this would provide an additional explanation for incomplete pass-through of
commodity costs or exchange rates to prices (see Goldberg and Knetter (1997) for a discussion of this issue).
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where Wch is the discounted expected value of the firm if it adjusts its price and Wnch is the
discounted expected value of the firm if it maintains a fixed price, based on the firm’s expectations
regarding its competitors’ prices. (Recall that the menu costs of a firm’s competitors are assumed
to be private information.) Given the pricing policies of its competitors, the firm adjusts its price
if the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. The firm’s pricing policy is given by the following
policy rule,
pjmt =
{
pwjmt−1 if ∆W < γjmt
pw∗jmt otherwise
(22)
where the firm’s price conditional on adjustment is given by,
pw∗jmt = arg max
pwjmt
Et [pijmt(pwmt, Ct) + βVj(p
w
mt, Ct+1, γjmt+1)] . (23)
In an equilibrium, all firms set their prices according to the decision rule implied by equations (22)
and (23). Solving for the firms’ optimal policy functions is complicated by the fact that the firms’
incentives to adjust their prices depend, in turn, on the prices of the other firms.
We solve the model numerically using the computational algorithm described in appendix A.
The algorithm is conceptually straightforward but computationally intensive. We begin with some
initial values of the firms’ pricing policies. For a given firm, say Firm 1, we solve for the optimal
dynamic pricing policy conditional on the initial pricing policies of its competitors by value function
iteration. We use the solution to this problem to update the assumed pricing policy for Firm 1.
Next, we solve for Firm 2’s optimal dynamic pricing policy, conditioning on the updated pricing
policy for Firm 1. We repeat this exercise until the maximum differences in the firms’ pricing
policies between successive iterations are sufficiently small. Once this point is reached, we run our
algorithm for an additional 1500 iterations to check that the equilibrium does not change.
6.2 Parameters
Given the computationally intensive nature of the iterative procedure, it is not possible to separately
analyze the implications for all possible markets. We focus on a representative market: the Syracuse
market. The Syracuse market has a representative market structure dominated by P&G (Folgers),
Kraft (Maxwell House) and Sara Lee (Hills Brothers). The average annual revenue in the Syracuse
market is approximately 3 million dollars, which is close to the median across markets in my sample.
Each brand produces two different products according to the definition discussed in section 4, so
we have two products per firm and 6 products in total.
We parameterize the demand curve according to the random coefficients discrete choice model
estimated in section 4. The demand curve estimation procedure is entirely independent of our
assumptions about the supply side of the model. We do, however, need to rely on the implications
of our model for average prices in determining the local cost parameters. In our baseline specification
of the dynamic model, we make use of the estimates of average non-coffee costs, µkm, implied by the
static pricing model described in section 5. Specifically, we take µkm to be the average non-coffee
costs,
µkm =
1
T
T∑
t=1
[
pˆwkmt − Ω−1sˆkmt − Ct
]
. (24)
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In simple models with a quadratic loss function (e.g. Dixit, 1991), symmetry implies that the
average price in the dynamic model equals the average price in the static model. This property
does not hold in the present model because of asymmetries in the profit function and strategic
interactions that imply that certainty equivalence does not hold.50 To gauge the robustness of
the procedure used to estimate local costs, we also consider an alternative approach in which we
estimate a common component of marginal costs as part of the dynamic estimation procedure. The
alternative estimation procedure is presented in appendix B. This approach is meant to account for
the fact that the dynamic model may imply higher or lower prices on average for a given level of
marginal costs—leading to different estimates of local costs than in the static model presented in
section 5. We find, however, that these effects are numerically small. This procedure yields almost
identical estimates of local costs to the estimates based on the static model described above.
We parameterize the retail margin ξk as the average difference between retail and wholesale
prices for a particular market and brand. Moreover, we parameterize the average price difference
αk in equation (17) as the average observed difference in retail prices. We also condition on the
observed value of wholesale prices in the period before the simulations begin (1999 Q4). We set
the standard deviation of shocks to commodity costs equal to the observed standard deviation of
commodity costs σC over the sample period.
The remaining parameter is the mean of the menu cost distribution, σ. We estimate this
parameter to match the observed frequency of wholesale price change using the indirect estimation
approach of Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault (1993) for dynamic models. In particular, we use
the following procedure in selecting the menu cost parameter. For different values of the menu cost
parameter σ, we simulate the model for the actual observed values of the commodity cost index
over the 2000-2005 period. We then carry out a grid search over alternative possible values of σ.
The menu cost estimate is chosen to minimize the loss function,
L = (f − fˆ)2, (25)
where f is the overall frequency of price change predicted by the model (across all time periods
and brands), and fˆ is the actual average frequency of price change excluding trade deals over the
2000-2005 period.51 The average frequency of price change excluding trade deals over this period
was 1.3 times per year or a monthly frequency of about 11%.52 Figure 4 presents a diagram of
L for different values of σ, where σ is reported as a fraction of average annual revenue of coffee
manufacturers in the Syracuse market over the 2000-2005 period. Figure 4 shows that the frequency
of price changes is monotonically decreasing in the menu cost. Thus, the loss function has a clear
minimum in the range of parameters we consider.
50Empirically, asymmetries in the profit function imply that the losses to the firm from setting the price suboptimally
low are greater than the losses from setting the price suboptimally high, where the deviations in the upward and
downward direction are by the same amount. In our quantitative analysis of this issue below, we find that the average
dynamic optimal price is typically slightly higher than the average static optimal price.
51Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault (1993) do not formally extend their analysis to the case of dynamic models
with discontinuities in the sample moment. However, Dridi (1999) argues that the technical apparatus used to analyze
this case for static models may be extended to dynamic models. Magnac, Robin, and Visser (1995) find that this
estimator performs well in a dynamic model in Monte Carlo simulations.
52A limitation of this model is that it does not explain trade deals. In a model with trade deals, one would expect
pass-through to increase, since trade deals provide an additional mechanism for transmitting cost shocks. In the
present application, this effect may be small. As we discuss in section 3, trade deals are relatively unimportant in
explaining cost pass-through in this market.
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Table 7 presents the results of this estimation procedure. The value of σ that best matches the
frequency of price change implied by the model to the observed frequency of price change is 0.23%
of average annual revenues per firm. Since the firm disproportionately adjusts its price when it
draws a low value of the menu cost, the average menu cost actually paid by the firm is substantially
lower. An advantage of the loss function (25) that we consider is that it is easy to minimize with
numerical methods because it is a well-behaved function with a unique local minimum.53
The standard error of this estimate may be calculated using the formulas presented in Gourier-
oux, Monfort, and Renault (1993) for the case of static moments in dynamic models. In evaluating
this formula, we use a numerical estimate of the derivative of the loss function with respect to the
parameter estimate. We estimate the variance of the sample moment using a parametric boot-
strap.54 This procedure yields a standard error of 0.09% for menu costs as a fraction of average
annual revenues, implying an upper bound for the 95% confidence interval of the estimator of
0.33%.
There are few existing estimates of the costs of price adjustment at the manufacturer level.
Zbaracki et al. (2004), estimate that costs of price adjustment account for 1.22% of annual revenue
in a large industrial firm based on direct measures of the costs of price adjustment. Goldberg and
Hellerstein (2007) estimate lower and upper bounds for menu costs in the beer industry of between
0 and 0.443% of revenue.55 Aguirregabiria (1999) and also Levy et al. (1997) estimate menu costs
of 0.7% of revenue, though these estimates are less directly comparable to ours since they refer to
retailer rather than manufacturer-level barriers to price adjustment. Slade (1998) estimates retail
menu costs of $2.70 per price change for a particular retail store, but does not report the magnitude
of the menu costs relative to annual revenues.
6.3 Equilibrium Pricing Policies
From the perspective of a firm’s competitors, a firm’s pricing policy gives 1) what price the firm
adjusts to conditional on adjusting and 2) the probability of adjustment conditional on the publicly
observable variables; i.e., pwmt−1 and Ct. The probability of adjustment depends on a firm’s past
price since firms are more likely to adjust if there is a large difference between the firm’s past price
and its current desired price. Figure 5 plots an example (for a particular firm and time period) of
a firm’s probability of adjustment in period t as a function of its period t − 1 price. This figure
gives the expected probability of adjustment, where the expectation is taken over different values
of the random menu cost γjmt. In this example, the optimal dynamic price is $0.138 per ounce. At
this price, the probability of adjustment is zero. The probability that the firm will adjust its price
53As a robustness check, we also considered two alternative estimators. We considered an estimator based on a
loss function similar to (25), but defining f and fˆ as vectors, with each element of the vectors defined as the average
frequency of price change in a particular year. We also considered an analogous estimator, with each element of f and
fˆ defined as the average frequency of price change for a particular product. These alternative estimation approaches
yielded similar results to our baseline approach, though the resulting loss functions were somewhat less smooth than
in our baseline estimation approach.
54Specifically, we evaluate the sample moment for alternative draws of costs from the assumed Markov process for
costs. We calculate the variance of the sample moment based on these draws. This approach takes into consideration
sampling error in the menu cost as well as commodity costs, but not parameter uncertainty arising from the estimation
of the demand system.
55Goldberg and Hellerstein (2007) estimate a static model of price adjustment while we estimate a dynamic model.
We discuss this issue further in section 7.
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increases monotonically with the distance from the dynamic optimal price.
The fact that firms only adjust their prices if they deviate sufficiently far away from the dynamic
optimal price causes prices to respond in a delayed fashion to costs. The intuition is the following.
In the first period after a shock, firms have a low probability of adjusting immediately in response
to a change in costs. As shocks accumulate, however, the firm’s probability of adjusting grows.
Eventually, the firm adjusts to the new dynamic optimal price which reflects all of the cost shocks
that have accumulated since its last price change. This pricing behavior leads to delayed pass-
through of costs into prices.
A firm’s optimal pricing policy also depends on its competitors’ prices. The demand model
described in section 4 implies that prices may be either strategic complements or substitutes. For
the estimated parameter values, prices are, in most (but not all) cases, strategic complements.
Figure 6 plots an example of Firm 3’s probability of adjustment as a function of its competitors’
previous prices, all else constant. In this example, Firm 3’s dynamic optimal price lies above
its price in the previous period. Since Firm 3’s price and its competitors’ prices are strategic
complements, Firm 3 has, for the most part, a higher probability of raising its price given higher
values of its competitors’ past prices. As Figure 6 shows, however, the probability of adjustment
is not monotonically increasing in competitors’ prices. Non-monotonic relationships of this nature
arise frequently in this pricing game for the following reason. Firm 3 cares about the past prices of
its competitors only through their potential effect on current prices. As a competitor’s time t− 1
price rises, it becomes increasingly likely that the competitor will readjust its price downward in
period t—and this, in turn, lessens Firm 3’s incentive to raise its price.
7 Dynamic Pricing Implications
In this section, we analyze the implications of our model for short and long-run price dynamics. We
begin by investigating whether the model can generate quantitatively realistic predictions for the
timing of price adjustments, a key determinant of short-run price dynamics. To do this, we simulate
the model for the actual sequence of costs over the 2000-2004 period based on the equilibrium policy
rules. For each simulation, we draw new values of the firms’ menu costs. We then calculate the
average frequency of price change by year across the simulations. We assume that the stochastic
process generating costs (20)—which determines the firms’ perceptions about the cost process—is
fixed over the sample period. All of the variation in costs therefore arises from random variation
in the shocks to this process C .
Figure 7 plots the annual frequency of price adjustment for the model versus the data. In the
model, as in the data, the frequency of wholesale price change is strongly positively related to the
volatility of commodity costs: the minimum average frequency of price adjustment in both the
model and the data occurs in 2003, while the maximum occurs in 2000. The model is also able to
explain a substantial component of the short-run dynamics in the timing of price adjustments. The
observed pattern of price adjustments strongly favors menu cost models over pricing models in which
firms set prices in a purely “time-dependent” fashion. A central prediction of the menu cost model is
that price adjustments occur more frequently in periods when marginal costs change substantially.
This prediction has typically been challenging to test given the difficulty of observing marginal
costs. In contrast, time dependent models of price-setting in which firms set prices according to a
24
fixed schedule (Taylor, 1980) or adjust prices with a fixed probability (Calvo, 1983) predict that
the timing of price adjustments is unrelated to changes in costs. The finding that the timing
of price changes responds to movements in costs also contrasts with the predictions of “rational
inattention” models of price adjustment in which firms are assumed to have a limited capacity to
process information (e.g. Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2008). A shortcoming of the model revealed
by figure 7 is that the frequency of price change covaries even more with commodity cost volatility
in the data than the model. For example, the frequency of price change falls even more between
2000 and 2003 in the data than in our dynamic pricing model.56
To provide more insight into the timing of price adjustments, figure 8 depicts the frequency of
price change at a quarterly frequency for the model vs. the data. The local peaks in the probability
of price change in the model and the data coincide closely in 4 of 5 cases (in the fifth case, there is
a peak in the simulated data in 2004Q1, but no corresponding peak in the data). The figure also
plots the absolute value of the commodity cost change over the course of the corresponding quarter
(measured on the right-hand axis). While there is a clear positive correlation between the magnitude
of commodity cost movements and price adjustments at low frequencies, the relationship is more
complex at a quarterly frequency. For example, the absolute movement in coffee commodity costs is
particularly high in early 2002 relative to the previous or subsequent months, but the probability of
price change is particularly low in both the model and the data. In the model, the low correlation
between commodity cost movements and price adjustments at high frequencies is explained by
the fact that commodity cost movements must build up for several quarters before a firm has
an incentive to adjust. It is therefore the cumulative movement in commodity costs over several
quarters that matters, rather than the movement in any particular quarter. This low correlation
between the timing of price adjustments and commodity cost movements at high frequencies is also
present in the data.57
Next, we analyze the dynamics of the short-run response of prices to costs. We estimate a cost
pass-through regression of the form of equation (1) for the simulated data. Figure 9 depicts the
impulse response function of wholesale prices in response to a given percentage change in commodity
costs. The impulse response is constructed from the estimated pass-through regression for wholesale
prices using the simulated data. The model generates quantitatively realistic predictions for the
short-run dynamics of prices. We find that in the model as in the data, less than half of the long-run
response of prices to costs occurs in the quarter of the shock. The impulse response for model fits
the data particularly well for the first two quarters after the shock to costs. There is a slightly
greater responsiveness of prices in the third quarter after the shock in the model than in the data.
The short-run dynamics of prices are driven by two factors: the frequency of price adjustment
and strategic interactions among firms. It goes without saying that there can be no price response
to an exchange rate change so long as the price remains unchanged. But even once the price adjusts,
if prices are strategic complements, then the failure of one firm to adjust to a movement in exchange
rates leads another firm to delay adjustment as well (Bulow et al., 1985). In this way, strategic
56This may indicate that the assumed distribution of menu costs (exponential) is more dispersed than in the actual
distribution. A more dispersed distribution of menu costs generates less variation in the frequency of price change
over time since there are more “randomly timed” adjustments in prices. However, the exponential distribution leads
to important simplifications in terms of both simulation and estimation. We therefore leave this generalization to
future research.
57The statistics for the model are averages over a very large number of price simulations, so it is not surprising
that the empirical series exhibits somewhat more “spikiness” than the corresponding theoretical series.
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complementarities among prices can substantially amplify the delays in price adjustment associated
with price rigidity. We find, however, that these effects are quantitatively small for our estimated
model. Almost all of pass-through takes place within three quarters, which is slightly longer than
the average duration of prices in the model. One reason why strategic complementarity has a
limited ability to amplify delays in pass-through due to price rigidity is that there is a substantial
amount of coordination in the timing of price adjustments around times of large movements in
commodity costs.
The model also yields quantitatively realistic predictions for long-run pass-through. The fourth
column of table 8 presents the results of a pass-through regression using the simulated data. Long-
run pass-through for the simulated data into retail prices is 0.272 vs. 0.252 in the data. Thus, the
model successfully explains almost all of the incomplete pass-through observed in the data.
It is worth emphasizing that neither the model’s fit to the dynamics of pass-through nor its fit
to the timing of price adjustments are “guaranteed” by the estimation procedure. The menu costs
are estimated based on the frequency of price change over the entire sample period. The demand
curve estimation procedure is based purely on the response of consumer demand to fluctuations
in prices—the estimation procedure does not make use of information regarding firm’s pricing
behavior. The estimates of local costs make use of the average difference between prices and green
bean coffee costs over the entire sample period for each product, as well as the demand system
estimates, but again do not make use of any information on how prices respond to movements in
costs. The model’s implications for pass-through depend on properties of the demand curve, the
estimated menu costs, as well as the specification of the supply side of the model. We discuss how
these factors affect pass-through in greater detail in section 8.
We next use the dynamic model to investigate the sources of long-run incomplete pass-through.
In evaluating this question, the Dixit-Stiglitz pricing model serves as a useful benchmark both
because it is the workhorse model of demand in international economics and because, as is well-
known, this specification implies a constant markup pricing rule. This allows us to quantify the
effect of introducing the estimated random coefficients demand curve on the extent of markup
adjustment by firms.58
Table 8 presents the results of pass-through regressions for simulated data from each of the
four alternative pricing models. The first specification is the standard monopolistic-competition
Dixit-Stiglitz model. The second specification introduces local costs. In this specification, we again
assume the Dixit-Stiglitz demand model, but we allow for local costs parameterized according to
equation (24) and a retail margin parameterized by equation (18).59 This specification implies a
long-run pass-through of 0.407.
The third specification incorporates markup adjustment as well as local costs. We replace the
constant elasticity of substitution demand model with the static random coefficients discrete choice
model examined in section 5.60 This specification yields a long-run pass-through of 0.273. Long-
58The constant markup result also holds for the case of a finite number of firms, though in that case the markup
depends on the number of firms in the market. (Anderson, Palma and Thisse, 1992).
59We estimate the Dixit-Stiglitz model using the same data and instruments used to estimate the random coefficients
discrete choice model. The resulting demand curve is yjmt = Ct
(
prjmt/Pt
)−θ
, where the estimated elasticity of
substitution is θ = 2.92.
60Since the solution method for this model is standard, we discuss it in Appendix C (see e.g. Berry, Levinsohn and
Pakes, 1995; Petrin, 2001 for a detailed discussion). Note that this model is not identical to the dynamic model with
no menu costs since it does not assume asymmetric information.
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run pass-through therefore falls substantially in the discrete choice model relative to the constant
elasticity of substitution model. The fourth column adds pricing dynamics in the form of the menu
cost model presented in section 6, implying that long-run pass-through falls to 0.272.
Comparing this set of statistics, we find that local costs reduce long-run pass-through by a
factor of 59% relative to a CES benchmark, while markup adjustment reduces pass-through by an
additional factor of 33%. We find that menu costs have a negligible effect on pass-through after 6
quarters. The result that local costs play a key role in explaining low observed pass-through echoes
the conclusions of other industry studies by Goldberg and Verboven (2001), Hellerstein (2005) and
Goldberg and Hellerstein (2007), as well as the analysis by Burstein et al. (2003) of local costs
based on input-output tables. Our conclusions differ significantly from those of Burstein et al.
(2003) who attribute the entire difference between prices and marginal costs—and therefore all of
the observed incomplete pass-through—to local costs. In contrast, our estimated demand curve
and structural pricing model imply that markups are substantial, leaving considerable room for
markup adjustment.
Our estimates imply that the markup adjustment in response to cost shocks is substantial in
the long-run: firms are estimated to compress their gross margins on average by a factor of 1/3 in
response to a marginal cost increase. The magnitude of the markup adjustment depends crucially
on the curvature of the demand curve. If the elasticity of demand increases as the firm raises its
price, the firm is less inclined to raise its price in response to a rise in costs.
One way of summarizing this curvature is in terms of the estimated “super-elasticity” of
demand–the percentage change in the price elasticity for a given percentage increase in prices
(Klenow and Willis, 2006). This super-elasticity is zero by assumption in the Dixit-Stiglitz model.
In contrast, an advantage of the random coefficients demand system we consider is that it permits
a great deal of flexibility in the specification of the curvature of demand. Our estimated demand
curve, which implies a super-elasticity of demand of 4.64, generates a substantial motive for markup
adjustment. Depending on the parameters used, however, the random coefficients demand system
can generate a wide variety of possible curvatures of demand—and therefore, a wide variety of
potential implications for pass-through. We investigate how our results vary for alternative param-
eterizations of the demand curve in section 8.
Finally, our estimates imply that menu costs have almost no impact on long-run pass-through.
In this regard, our results contrast with a large literature in international macroeconomics in which
sticky prices play a central role in lowering the responsiveness of prices to exchange rates (see e.g.
Engel (2002)). This conclusion depends importantly on the dynamics of marginal costs. If marginal
costs are highly transitory, then firms only adjust partially to a given cost shock in order to avoid
having to readjust their prices in the near future. We analyze this effect quantitatively in the next
section.61
8 Counterfactual Experiments
We next carry out a quantitative investigation of a number of the factors discussed above—the
volatility and persistence of costs, the timing of price adjustments, and the curvature of demand—
61The role of menu costs in slowing the response of prices to costs also depends on the nature of strategic interactions,
as we discuss above.
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in explaining the short-run and long-run dynamics of pass-through. We do this by repeating the
types of quantitative experiments we carried out above for various alternative parameter values.
We first investigate how pass-through depends on the persistence of marginal costs. To do this,
we consider counterfactual experiments where we hold fixed the actual sequence of costs faced by
the firms, but make different assumptions about what firms believe regarding the stochastic process
generating marginal costs (i.e., equation (20)). The menu cost is adjusted to hold the frequency of
price change in each simulation equal to the observed frequency of price change.
Table 9 (columns 3-4) presents pass-through regressions for cases where ρC = 0.9 and ρC =
0.5. The variance and constant term in the alternative cost processes are chosen to match the
corresponding unconditional statistics in the data. Quantitatively, the persistence of marginal
costs has a substantial role in determining long-run pass-through. As we move from the baseline
specification in which costs have a unit root to the case with ρC = 0.5, the long-run pass-through
drops from 0.272 (the baseline case) to 0.161. Even for the case with ρC = 0.9 the pass-through
is 0.210, which is substantially lower than in the baseline specification. Intuitively, firms adjust
incompletely to changes in costs even over the longer horizon because they expect costs to revert to
some “normal” level. This effect does not arise in the case where marginal costs have a unit root.
The role of persistence in determining pass-through has also been discussed in somewhat different
models by Taylor (2000) and Kasa (1992).
Second, we consider how the timing of price changes implied by the menu cost model affects
pass-through. We compare pass-through in the menu cost model to pass-through in the Calvo
(1983) model in which the timing of price changes is random. The Calvo model is a workhorse of
the macroeconomics and international economics literatures. In the Calvo specification, we assume
that instead of facing a menu cost as in the model in section 6, firms are randomly selected to adjust
their prices with probability αcalvo. We choose αcalvo to fit the observed frequency of price change
as in the other simulations. Otherwise, the model is unchanged, and has the same parameterization
as the baseline model.
Table 9 (columns 5-6) presents the results of pass-through regressions for the Calvo model. The
baseline Calvo model implies substantially more delayed pass-through than the menu cost model:
only about 25% of pass-through occurs in the first quarter on average compared to an average of
40% in the menu cost model. This difference arises because, in the menu cost model, prices adjust
rapidly to large and persistent cost shocks. Table 9 also presents results for the Calvo model with
ρC = 0.9. Lowering the persistence of costs has an even greater effect on the results for the Calvo
model than for the menu cost model: the long-run pass-through falls from 0.272 in the baseline
specification to 0.162 in the specification with lower persistence.
Third, we investigate how the predictions of our model depend on the curvature of demand.
In our structural model of demand, the key parameters that determine the curvature of demand
are those that relate to the degree of consumer heterogeneity. The literature on differentiated
products demand systems with consumer heterogeneity (e.g. Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995)
has emphasized that consumer heterogeneity can lead to higher markups for higher priced items.
Yet, a high degree of consumer heterogeneity also has important implications for pass-through.
The more heterogeneous are consumers in their degree of price sensitivity, the more a firm has an
incentive to raise its markup as costs rise, since the firm’s consumer base is increasingly dominated
by less price sensitive consumers.
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To illustrate this effect, the last column of table 9 presents the results of a pass-through regres-
sion for a case where heterogeneity is 350% larger than in the baseline case; i.e., where we raise the
standard deviation of heterogeneity in price sensitivity Πyp by 350%. This change in the parameter
values significantly affects the curvature of the demand curve. The median super-elasticity of de-
mand is about 20% lower in this case than the baseline case (3.72 vs. 4.64). This specification also
leads to substantially greater long-run pass-through: long-run pass-through is about 1/3 greater
than in the baseline case.
Finally, we study how the dynamics of marginal costs affect our estimates of price rigidity.
Table 10 (columns 3-4) presents menu cost estimates for the cases where ρC = 0.5 and ρC = 0.9
discussed above. Lower persistence of costs is associated with lower menu cost estimates since firms
realize that current changes in costs are likely to be only temporary. The perceived persistence of
cost shocks has a huge effect on the menu costs required to match the frequency of price change
observed in the data. The specification with ρC = 0.5 implies that the menu costs required to
sustain the price rigidity observed in the data are about 1/5 what they are in the unit root case.
Even in the case with ρC = 0.9, the menu costs required to sustain the level of price rigidity are
1/2 what they are in the unit root case.
Similarly, higher volatility reduces the firm’s incentive to adjust because it increases the “option
value” from waiting to see what costs will be in the next period (Dixit, 1991). Columns 5-6 present
the menu costs required to match the observed price rigidity for cases where the standard deviation
of cost shocks σ2C is assumed to be higher or lower than in the baseline case. Quantitatively, the
option value effects are substantial. Lowering the standard deviation of costs to half the baseline
case implies that the required menu costs are 150% what they are in the baseline case; while raising
the standard deviation to twice what it is in the baseline case implies menu costs that are about
50% of the baseline value.
One approximation that has sometimes been used in the industrial organization and interna-
tional economics literatures to evaluate the magnitude of barriers to price adjustment is to compare
the profits from fixed prices to profits when prices are set at the static optimum in every period
(e.g. Leslie, 2004; Goldberg and Hellerstein, 2007).62 One can evaluate the effects of this type of
approximation by considering a static version of the model with the discount factor β set to zero.
In this case, the firm simply compares the static profits from adjusting to the menu cost in each
period. The last column of Table 10 shows that this procedure yields a menu cost estimate that is
only 30% of what it is in the dynamic model with forward-looking behavior. The static procedure
underestimates the magnitude of menu costs because it overlooks the fact that in deciding whether
to adjust, the firm not only considers benefits today but also benefits in the future. These benefits
are substantial when costs are persistent. Thus, menu cost estimates based on static procedures are
likely to be substantially lower than estimates from dynamic models when costs are persistent.63
It is important to note that the presence of local costs, as well as the low estimated demand
elasticity, also contribute to the ability of small menu costs to sustain a large amount of price
62Goldberg and Hellerstein (2007) note that in this approach, the menu cost estimate may be interpreted exactly
as a combination of both the fixed costs of price adjustment and the option value of not adjusting.
63The menu cost estimate for β = 0 is much more similar to the menu cost estimate for ρC = 0.5 than to the
estimate for the baseline case with unit root costs. This arises since the future benefits of adjustment are smaller
when costs are less persistent. The menu cost estimate for ρC = 0 is actually lower than the estimate for β = 0. This
difference arises because the static analysis also abstracts from the “option value” associated with not adjusting.
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rigidity. Though we do not report these comparative statics here, if the price elasticity were higher,
the costs to the firm of not adjusting its prices would be much greater. Larger menu costs would
therefore be required to sustain the observed price rigidity. Similarly, if local costs were a smaller
fraction of overall marginal costs, the firm’s incentive to adjust its price in response to a given
movement in the commodity cost would be greater, all else constant, implying that a higher menu
cost would be required to sustain the observed degree of price rigidity.
9 Conclusion
A large literature in international economics studies the response of domestic prices to fluctuations
in imported costs. We use data on coffee prices at the retail, wholesale and commodity cost levels
to study how variations in the price of imported inputs translate into changes in downstream prices.
For both retail and wholesale prices, we find that pass-through is delayed and incomplete: a one
percent increase in coffee commodity costs leads to a long-run increase in prices (over 6 quarters) of
approximately a third of a percent. More than half of the price adjustment occurs in the quarters
after the change in cost.
Reduced-form regressions indicate the delayed response of wholesale prices to costs in this indus-
try occurs almost entirely at the wholesale level. We document substantial rigidity in manufacturer
coffee prices: over the time period we consider, manufacturer prices of ground coffee adjust on aver-
age 1.3 times per year, while retail prices excluding sales adjust on average 1.5 times per year over
the same time period. We find a strong positive relationship between the frequency of wholesale
price changes and the magnitude of movements in commodity costs.
We develop an oligopoly menu cost model of pricing for the coffee industry, where the barriers
to price adjustment are estimated to match the frequency of wholesale price adjustment. The
model explains the strong tendency of prices to adjust more frequently in periods when commodity
costs experience large adjustments. We also find that the model provides a quantitatively realistic
explanation for both long-run and short-run pass-through. The long-run implications of the model
depend crucially on the estimated curvature of demand.
We use the model to analyze the relative importance of markup adjustment, local costs, and
barriers to price adjustment in determining incomplete pass-through. We successively introduce
these features into a benchmark Dixit-Stiglitz pricing model to determine their role in explaining
long-run incomplete pass-through. The decomposition implies that local costs reduce long-run
pass-through by a factor of 59% relative to a CES benchmark, while markup adjustment reduces
pass-through by an additional factor of 33%. Menu costs have a negligible effect on long-run pass-
through. Nevertheless, menu costs are quantitatively successful in explaining the observed delayed
response of prices to costs.
Finally, we carry out a number of counterfactual simulations to investigate how pass-through
in the model depends on the persistence of costs, the degree of consumer heterogeneity and the
model of price adjustment behavior (i.e., menu cost vs. Calvo). We show that all of these factors
play an important role in determining pass-through. We also show that menu cost estimates based
on static procedures are likely to differ substantially from estimates based on dynamic models. We
find that the direction of the bias of static estimates of menu costs depends importantly on the
persistence of marginal costs.
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The dynamic pricing model we analyze provides considerable insight into the timing of whole-
sale price changes, which is driven largely by volatility in the underlying coffee commodity costs,
as we discuss above. In contrast, many retail price adjustments are associated with temporary
sales. The timing of temporary sales appears largely unrelated to both wholesale price movements
and commodity costs. Nakamura (2008) notes that the timing of price adjustments is also largely
uncorrelated across different retail chains. These facts suggest that complex dynamic pricing strate-
gies are likely to be important in understanding the timing of retail price adjustments in relation
to movements in underlying manufacturer marginal costs. This is an important topic for future
research.
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A Computational Algorithm
We solve for equilibrium prices in the dynamic pricing model using the following iterative procedure.
For expositional simplicity, we present the algorithm for the case of two firms j = 1, 2. It is, however,
easy to see how the algorithm can be generalized to the case of n firms. We will begin by describing
the value function iteration procedure used to solve each individual firm’s dynamic pricing problem.
Suppose we start with an initial value for firm j’s expected value EVj at time t− 1,
EVj(pw1t−1, p
w
2t−1, Ct−1) = Et−1Vj(p
w
1t−1, p
w
2t−1, Ct, γjt), (26)
where Vj is the value function described in section 6 and Et−1 is the expectation conditional on all
information known by firm j at time t− 1.
The value function iteration procedes by iteratively updating EVj until a fixed point is obtained.
We next describe the procedure we use to update EVj in the value function iteration. The first
step is to calculate the value from different possible prices excluding the menu cost,
W ′(pw1t, p
w
2t, ct) = pijt(p
w
1t, p
w
2t, Ct) + βEVj(p
w
1t, p
w
2t, Ct). (27)
This expression depends on the current prices of the firm’s competitors as well as current costs.
The second step in updating the value function is to calculate the expectation of W ′ over
competitors’ prices. The menu cost model implies a simple structure for this expectation since
firm j′ has probability 1 − prj′ of maintaining its current price, and probability prj′ of changing
its price. Let us denote the firm’s price conditional on adjusting by pw∗jt . A given firm’s pricing
strategy depends on the entire vector of past prices (pw1t−1, pw2t−1). Denoting the expectation over
competitors’ prices as W ′′ we have,
W ′′(Ct, pw1t; p
w
1t−1, p
w
2t−1) = (1− pr2)W ′(pw1t, pw2t−1, Ct) + pr2W ′(pw1t, pw∗2 , Ct). (28)
Third, we must calculate the firm’s optimal pricing policy. There are two relevant cases. The
expectation if the firm does not adjust its price is
Wnch(pw1t−1, p
w
2t−1, Ct) = W
′′(Ct, pw1t−1; p
w
1t−1, p
w
2t−1), (29)
while the expectation if it does adjust its price is
Wch(pw1t−1, p
w
2t−1, Ct) = max
pw1t
W ′′(Ct, pw1t; p
w
1t−1, p
w
2t−1). (30)
The firm’s decision about whether to adjust its price depends on the difference between its
payoffs when it adjusts and when it does not adjust,
∆W = Wch(pw1t−1, p
w
2t−1, Ct)−Wnch(pw1t−1, pw2t−1, Ct). (31)
The firm adjusts its price when ∆W > γjt while it maintains a fixed price when ∆W <= γjt.
Recall that we assume that the menu cost γjt is independent and identically distributed with an
exponential distribution; i.e., F (γjt) = 1 − exp (− 1σγjt). The probability of price adjustment is
therefore Prch = F (∆W ), where F (x) = 1− exp (− 1σx).
Fourth, in order to update the firm’s value, we must calculate the expected menu cost if the
firm changes its price. The expected menu cost differs from the mean of the menu cost distribution
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since the firm is more likely to adjust its price when it faces a low menu cost. The optimal pricing
policy implies that the firm adjusts only when ∆W > γjt. Since we assume that the menu cost is
distributed exponentially, the firm’s expected menu cost takes the form,
E(γjt|γjt < ∆W ) = σ −
∆W exp −1σ ∆W
exp −1σ ∆W
. (32)
The expected value is a weighted average of its value conditional on adjusting and not adjusting,
W = (1− Prch)Wnch + Prch[Wch − E(γjt|γjt < ∆W )]. (33)
Finally, we use the the stochastic process for costs to take an expectation over future commodity
costs at time t− 1. We discretize the process for costs given by (20) using the method of Tauchen
(1986). This implies a discrete Markov process with the transition matrix Λ. Applying this Markov
transition matrix to W we have,
EVj = ΛW. (34)
We solve for the firm’s optimal policy by repeatedly applying this procedure to update EVj until
a fixed point is found.
This value function iteration procedure is nested within an “outer loop” that searches for a
fixed point in the firms’ dynamic pricing policies. In this outer loop, we first solve for firm 1’s
optimal policy, conditional on an initial value for the pricing policy of firm 2; and use the results to
update firm 1’s policy rule. We then solve for firm 2’s optimal policy, conditional on the updated
pricing policy of firm 1. We use the results of this exercise to update firm 2’s policy rule. We repeat
this exercise until the maximum differences in firm pricing policies between successive iterations are
sufficiently small. Once this point is reached, we run our algorithm for an additional 1500 iterations
to check that the equilibrium does not change.
One interesting feature of the dynamic model is that only the size of the menu cost relative to
the market size, γjt/M , matters in determining firm behavior. This can be seen by the following
argument. Let us assume that the value function V scales with M . By the definitions above,
∆W and W ′′ also scale with M in this case, implying that the firm’s optimal price conditional on
adjusting is invariant to M . Moreover, since ∆W scales with M , the probability of adjustment,
Prch = 1− exp (− 1σ∆W ) depends only on γjt/M . Thus, given our assumptions, the firm’s pricing
policy depends only on γjt/M . Since the value function is the discounted expected sum of future
profits (which scale with M conditional on prices), this allows us to verify our original claim that
the value function scales with M .
B Robustness of the Dynamic Estimation Procedure
In section 6, we use the static model to infer local costs in equation (24) to parameterize the dynamic
menu cost model. This is an approximation since the static first order conditions do not hold in
the dynamic model. In order to investigate the robustness of the dynamic estimation procedure,
we also consider the following procedure in which we estimate a common component in marginal
costs as part of the dynamic estimation procedure. We assume that the firms’ costs are given by,
mckmt = κ+ µk + Ct, . (35)
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where κ is the common shift parameter in costs. We use an analogous indirect estimation procedure
to the procedure described in section 6 to estimate the parameters of the model. We select the
common shift parameter κ and the mean of the menu cost distribution σ to minimize the loss
function,
L = (f − fˆ)2 + (p¯w − ¯ˆpw)2, (36)
where p¯w is the average wholesale price implied by the model and ¯ˆpw is the average wholesale price
in the data.
The resulting estimated shift parameter is 0.3 cents, implying that the average wholesale price
from the dynamic model is 14.4 cents rather than 14.3 cents for the original estimation procedure.
The menu cost estimate using this procedure is 0.26% (rather than 0.3%) of annual revenue. The
implications of the model for pass-through are almost identical to the implications of the model
parameterized according to the original estimation procedure.
C Calculating the Static Equilibrium Prices
In section 5 we show that equilibrium prices must satisfy the first-order conditions,
smt − Ω(pwmt −mcmt) = 0, (37)
where smt, pwmt , mcmt and ξmt are vectors consisting of skmt, p
w
kmt, mckmt, and ξkmt for k = 1, ...,K
respectively. As in the dynamic model, we assume that retail prices equal wholesale prices plus a
known constant margin ξk,
prkt = ξk + p
w
kt. (38)
Marginal cost is modeled as the sum of a product-specific constant and the commodity cost,
mckt = µk + Ct, (39)
where µk is a constant component of marginal costs that differs across products, estimated in the
same way as in the dynamic pricing model (using equation (24). We solve for the static equilibrium
prices by solving numerically for the vector of prices that solves equation (37) and checking that
the second order conditions are satisfied.
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TABLE 1  
Pass-Through Regressions 
Variable Log Specification Levels Specification 
 Retail Wholesale Retail Wholesale 
Δ Commodity Cost (t) 0.063 
(0.013) 
0.115 
(0.018) 
0.142 
(0.040) 
0.218 
(0.061) 
Δ Commodity Cost (t-1)  0.104 
(0.008) 
0.169 
(0.013) 
0.446 
(0.024) 
0.520 
(0.043) 
Δ Commodity Cost (t-2) 0.013 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
0.016 
(0.019) 
0.029 
(0.028) 
Δ Commodity Cost (t-3) 0.031 
(0.006) 
-0.016 
(0.009) 
0.080 
(0.018) 
0.004 
(0.026) 
Δ Commodity Cost (t-4) 0.048 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.013) 
0.144 
(0.018) 
0.023 
(0.030) 
Δ Commodity Cost (t-5) 0.007 
(0.006) 
0.025 
(0.011) 
0.070 
(0.017) 
0.067 
(0.031) 
Δ Commodity Cost (t-6) -0.015 
(0.008) 
-0.026 
(0.012) 
0.017 
(0.021) 
-0.009 
(0.029) 
Constant 0.033 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
0.007 
(0.0004) 
0.001 
(0.0005) 
Long-run Pass-through 0.252 
(0.007) 
0.262 
(0.018) 
0.916 
(0.023) 
0.852 
(0.052) 
Number of observations 40129 2867 40129 2867 
R squared 0.079 0.141 0.088 0.134 
The  retail price variable is the change in the UPC-level retail price per ounce in a particular US market over a quarter.  
The wholesale price variable is the change in the wholesale price per ounce (including trade deals) of a particular UPC 
in a particular US market over a quarter.  The standard errors are clustered by unique product and market to allow for 
arbitrary serial correlation in the error term for a given product.  The data cover the period 2000-2005.   
 
TABLE 2 
IV Regression of Retail on Wholesale Prices 
 Retail Prices 
Δ Wholesale Price(t) 0.958 
(0.131) 
Δ Wholesale Price (t-1)  -0.050 
(0.180) 
Δ Wholesale Price (t-2) 
 
-0.027 
(0.129) 
Constant 0.005 
(0.001) 
Quarter Dummies  YES 
Number of observations 2792 
Instruments Commodity Costs  
The  dependent variable is the change in the UPC-level monthly average of  
the retail price per ounce in a particular US market over a quarter.  The 
wholesale price variable is the change in the wholesale price per ounce 
(including trade deals) of a particular UPC in a particular US market over a 
quarter.  The standard errors are clustered by unique product and market to 
allow for arbitrary serial correlation in the error term.  The data cover the 
period 2000-2005.  Wholesale prices are instrumented for by current changes 
in commodity costs and Arabica futures as well as 6 lags of these variables.  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3 
Annual Frequency of Price Change 
Wholesale Prices Retail Prices 
 Without Retail 
Sales 
With Retail 
Sales 
 
1.3 
 
 
 
1.5 
 
3.1 
The wholesale price statistics are based on weekly wholesale price data for 
the period 1997-2004.  The first column presents the statistics for regular 
prices (excluding trade deals).  The observations are weighted by average 
retail revenue over the period 2000-2004.   The second and third columns of 
present statistics on the frequency of price change for retail prices of ground 
coffee from Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) based on monthly data from 
the CPI research database collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4 
Frequency of Price Change and Commodity Cost Volatility 
Year  Average Number of Price 
Changes 
Standard Deviation of 
Commodity Cost index 
1997 4.3 2.1 
1998 1.7 1.6 
1999 1.7 0.8 
2000 3.0 0.9 
2001 1.0 0.4 
2002 0.4 0.3 
2003 0.2 0.1 
2004 0.6 0.5 
 The second column gives a size-weighted average of the annual frequency of wholesale 
price change, not including trade deals.  These statistics are based on weekly wholesale 
price data for the period 1997-2004.  The observations are weighted by average retail 
revenue over the period 2000-2004 (the period covered by the retail data).  The third 
column gives the standard deviation of the coffee commodity index in units of cents per 
ounce.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5 
Demand Estimates 
  Logit Random 
Coefficients 
 OLS1 OLS2 IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 IV 
Price 2.92 
(0.37) 
10.59 
(1.05) 
16.36 
(1.54) 
14.60 
(1.17) 
12.67 
(3.59) 
17.29 
(1.33) 
17.76 
(0.78) 
Random 
Coefficients:  
       
     πy0       -1.03 
(1.31) 
     πyp       -3.24 
(0.09) 
Large size (>24 
ounces) 
0.47 
(0.13) 
0.12 
(0.10) 
-0.16 
(0.11) 
-0.08 
(0.10) 
0.14 
(0.19) 
-0.21 
(0.10) 
-0.28 
(0.08) 
Total advertising 
(1000's, quarterly) 
0.45 
(0.02) 
 
0.05 
(0.004) 
0.19 
(0.20) 
0.13 
(0.02) 
0.26 
(0.03) 
0.20 
(0.01) 
0.20 
(0.02) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Christmas dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Brand x Region 
dummies 
NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Instrument   Hausman Commodity 
Cost 
Exchange 
Rates 
Weather Weather 
Median Price 
Elasticity 
0.54 1.96 3.02 2.69 2.34 3.20 3.46* 
[2.59 4.48] 
Number of 
Observations 
22411 22411 22411 22411 22411 22411 22411 
The demand system is estimated using monthly averages of UPC-level retail prices per ounce in US markets.  The IV 
specifications  use instruments for both prices and advertising. Commodity cost instruments: the commodity cost 
index, current, one and three lags.  Hausman instruments: average price of product within the census division, current 
and lagged.  Exchange rate instruments: Brazil/US exchange rate and Colombia NEER (Source: IFS).  Weather 
instruments:   lagged minimum and maximum temperatures for the Sao Paulo / Congonhas (Brazil) and the Cali / 
Alfonso Bonill (Colombia) weather stations.  The standard errors are clustered by unique product and market to allow 
for arbitrary serial correlation in the error term.  *The 95% confidence interval is constructed using a parametric 
bootstrap.   I draw from a joint normal distribution representing the joint distribution of the coefficients.  
 
 
 
TABLE 6 
Markup and Local Costs 
Median Implied 
Markup 
Median Fraction of 
Costs Accounted for 
By Coffee 
58.3% 44.7% 
The first statistic gives the median percentage markup of prices over 
marginal costs. The second column gives the median fraction of 
marginal costs accounted for by green bean coffee.  These statistics 
are calculated from the static pricing model.  
 
TABLE 7 
Menu Cost Estimate 
Absolute Size As a Fraction of 
Average Annual Firm 
Revenue 
7000 
(2806) 
0.22% 
(0.09) 
The table presents menu cost estimates in dollars and as a fraction of 
average annual firm revenue in the Syracuse market.  The standard 
error is in parentheses and is calculated from standard asymptotic 
formulas for the simulated method of moments estimator, where the 
variance of the sample moment is calculated by a parametric 
bootstrap.  The standard error takes into consideration sampling error 
associated with random variation in the costs and the menu cost 
draw, but not sampling error in the estimated demand parameters.  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 8 
Pass-through Regressions for Simulated Data  
 Log Specification 
Variable Dixit-Stiglitz 
(no local 
costs) 
 
Dixit-Stiglitz 
(local costs) 
Static 
Discrete 
Choice 
 
Dynamic 
Discrete Choice 
Δ Commodity Cost (t) 1 0.407 0.213 0.105 
Δ Commodity Cost (t-1)  0 0.028 0.063 0.117 
Δ Commodity Cost (t-2) 0 -0.005 0.025 0.033 
Δ Commodity Cost (t-3) 0 -0.015 0.004 -0.007 
Δ Commodity Cost (t-4) 0 -0.011 -0.024 -0.011 
Δ Commodity Cost (t-5) 0 0.006 -0.021 0.020 
Δ Commodity Cost (t-6) 0 -0.003 0.014 0.016 
Constant 0 0.011 0.009 -0.0008 
Long-run Pass-through 1 0.407 0.273 0.272 
The dependent variable in all of the specifications is the simulated retail price per ounce in a particular market and 
quarter.  The price and cost variables are in logs.  Columns 2-5 estimate pass-through using the log specification.  The 
second column gives the implications of a Dixit-Stiglitz model.  The third column gives the implications of a Dixit-
Stiglitz model modified to allowing for local costs.  The fourth column gives the implications of the static discrete 
choice model, allowing for local costs and markup adjustment.  The fifth column gives the implications of the 
dynamic discrete choice model allowing for local costs, markup adjustment and menu costs.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 9 
Pass-through Regressions for Simulated Data (Counterfactual Parameters) 
  Alternative Persistence 
Parameters 
 
Calvo 
 High 
Heterogeneity 
Variable Baseline  
(Unit 
Root) 
 
Persistence
=0.5 
 
Persistence
=0.9 
Baseline 
(Unit 
Root) 
 
Persistence
=0.9 
Baseline  
(Unit  
Root) 
Δ Commodity Cost (t) 0.105 0.118 0.089 0.066 0.072 0.104 
Δ Commodity Cost (t-1)  0.117 0.085 0.097 0.098 0.103 0.117 
Δ Commodity Cost (t-2) 0.033 0.001 0.021 0.042 0.015 0.079 
Δ Commodity Cost (t-3) -0.007 -0.044 -0.013 0.009 -0.015 0.017 
Δ Commodity Cost (t-4) -0.011 -0.016 -0.013 0.000 -0.020 -0.013 
Δ Commodity Cost (t-5) 0.020 0.017 0.013 0.017 0.010 0.014 
Δ Commodity Cost (t-6) 0.016 0.000 0.014 0.016 -0.003 0.036 
Constant -0.0008 -0.009 0.001 -0.004 -0.010 0.013 
Long-run Pass-through 0.272 0.161 0.210 0.249 0.162 0.353 
The dependent variable in all of the specifications is the simulated retail price per ounce.  The price and cost variables are in 
logs.  The second column repeats the results for the baseline model. Columns 3-4 present pass-through regressions for the 
cases where ρC=0.5 and 0.9 respectively.  Columns 5-6 present results for the Calvo model for the cases where ρC=1 and 0.9 
respectively.  Column 7 presents results for the case where consumer heterogeneity is 350% what it is in the baseline 
parameterization.  
 
 
TABLE 10 
Menu Cost Estimates (Counterfactual Parameters) 
  Alternative Persistence 
Parameters 
Alternative Volatility 
Parameters 
Static  
Model 
 Baseline 
(Unit 
Root) 
 
Persistence
=0.5 
 
Persistence
=0.9 
 
Low 
Volatility 
 
High 
Volatility 
 
Discount 
Factor =0 
Menu Cost 
Estimate 
0.22% 0.049% 0.11% 0.33% 0.13% 0.065% 
       
The table presents menu cost estimates as a fraction of average annual firm revenue in the Syracuse market.   The 
first column repeats the baseline results.  Columns 3-7 present results for counterfactual parameter values.  Columns 
3-4 present results for the cases where ρC=0.5 and 0.9 respectively.  Columns 5-6 present results for the low and 
high volatility cases described in the text.  Column 7 presents results for a case where β=0 i.e. no forward-looking 
behavior.   
 
 
 
Figure 1: Retail, Wholesale and Commodity Prices 
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*The roasted coffee retail and ground coffee manufacturer prices are average prices from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics database on consumer and producer prices.  The Arabica 12 month futures price is from the New York 
Board of Trade.  The coffee commodity index is a weighted average of the prices of different types of green bean 
coffee.  The gap in the retail price series from Nov. 1998 to Sept. 1999 arises from missing data.  
 
Figure 2: A Typical Wholesale Price Series 
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*The gross wholesale price of a leading coffee brand.  The coffee commodity price is a weighted average of 
the prices of different types of coffee on the New York Board of Trade.  
Figure 3: Price Change Frequency vs. Commodity Cost Volatility 
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*This figure plots the average annual frequency of price change for the wholesale price (not including trade deals) 
vs. the  volatility of the commodity cost index for each of the years 1997-2004.  These statistics are based on 
weekly wholesale price data for the period 1997-2004.  The observations are weighted by average retail revenue 
over the period 2000-2004 (the period covered by the retail data).   
 
 
Figure 4: Squared Deviation between Observed and Predicted Price Change Frequency 
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*This figure plots the squared deviation between the average observed frequency of price change over the 2000-2005 
period and the frequency of price change predicted by the  menu cost oligopoly model as a function of the menu cost.  
The menu cost is reported as a fraction of average annual retail revenue per firm over the 2000-2005 period.   
Figure 5: Probability of Adjustment vs. Initial Price 
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*This figure plots an example of the  relationship between the probability of adjustment and the initial 
price in the menu cost model.  
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Figure 6: Probability of Adjustment as a Function of Competitors' Prices
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*This figure plots an example of the probability of adjustment as a function of competitors' prices in the menu cost model.  
Figure 7: Annual Predicted vs. Observed Frequency of Price Change  
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*This figure plots  the predicted annual frequency of price change for the dynamic model over the years 
2000-2005 as well as the observed frequency of price change for wholesale prices over this period. The 
statistics for the model are based on 10000 simulated price series. 
 
Figure 8:  Predicted and Observed Frequency of Price Change vs. Abs. Cost Change 
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*This figure plots predicted quarterly frequency of price change for the dynamic model over the years 2000-2005 as 
well as the observed average frequency of wholesale price change.  The figure also plots the average absolute size of 
commodity cost change by quarter.  The statistics for the model are based on 10000 simulated price series. 
Figure 9: Impulse response to a Cost Shock 
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*This figure plots the impulse response of wholesale prices to a permanent 1 
percent cost shock implied by the model and the data.  The statistics for the 
model are based on 10000 simulated price series.   
